The Complex Response of Monetary Policy to the Exchange Rate

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Abstract

We estimate a flexible non-linear monetary policy rule for the UK to examine the response of policymakers to the real exchange rate. We have three main findings. First, policymakers respond to real exchange rate misalignment rather than to the real exchange rate itself. Second, policymakers ignore small deviations of the exchange rate; they only respond to real exchange under-valuations of more than 4% and over-valuations of more than 5%. Third, the response of policymakers to inflation is smaller when the exchange rate is over-valued and larger when it is under-valued. None of these responses is allowed for in the widely-used Taylor rule, suggesting that monetary policy is better analysed using a more sophisticated model, such as the one suggested in this paper.

JEL: C51; C52; E52; E58

Keywords: monetary policy, asset prices, nonlinearity

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1) Introduction

The importance of the exchange rate to monetary policy is reflected in large academic and policy-related literatures on the topic. We contribute to this literature by addressing three issues. First, although empirical models of open-economy monetary policy rules assume that interest rates respond to the exchange rate, policymakers and economic commentators often focus on exchange rate misalignment rather than the exchange rate itself. We therefore investigate whether interest rates respond to exchange rate misalignments rather than to the exchange rate itself. Second, existing models assume that policymakers respond to all movements in the real exchange rate. This may not be the case. As a consequence of a desire to avoid frequent small adjustments of the interest rate and difficulties in measuring exchange rate misalignment with precision, policymakers may only respond to larger real exchange rate misalignments. We investigate the evidence for this. Third, since the exchange rate influences inflation, we might expect the response of policymakers to inflation to depend on the exchange rate. For example, we might expect a less vigorous response to inflation when the exchange rate is over-valued and thus exerting downward pressure on inflation. We assess evidence for this.
We proceed as follows. Considering the issue of whether policymakers respond to exchange rates or to misalignments, the academic literature has tested the significance of the real exchange rate in monetary policy rules by estimating augmented Taylor rules which relate interest rates to inflation, the output gap and the exchange rate. However contributions by policymakers suggest another approach. For example, Nickell (2005), in discussing the appreciation of sterling that began in 1996 comments that “the dramatic rise in 1996/7.. led people to refer to unsustainability, misalignment and even bubbles… However as time passed and sterling [did not depreciate], talk of unsustainability and misalignment died away”. This suggests that policymakers may have responded to real exchange rate misalignments rather than the real exchange rate itself. This implies that existing models may be mispecified. We test whether policymakers respond to the real exchange rate itself or to exchange rate misalignments by comparing estimates of an augmented Taylor rule that includes the exchange rate against one that includes exchange rate misalignment.

We then consider whether the response of monetary policy to the real exchange rate is more sophisticated than allowed for in the simple monetary policy rules that have been used thus far in the literature. These monetary policy rules assume a constant proportional response to the exchange rate. However this may be too simplistic. As quoted in Adam et al (2005), the minutes of the March 1999 meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) state “it would not be sensible for policy to react to high frequency movements
in the exchange rate as this could lead to a more volatile path for interest rates..[which might].. make it more difficult for others to understand the motives for interest rate changes”. Taken together with the difficulty in accurately measuring exchange rate misalignment, this suggests that policymakers may respond more vigorously to larger exchange rate misalignments. Indeed the MPC minutes suggest that policymakers may only respond to large exchange rate misalignments.

We also consider whether the real exchange rate affects the response of policymakers to the inflation rate. Exchange rate misalignments affect the inflation rate; a large over-valuation, for example, places downward pressure on inflation. One might then expect the response of policymakers to inflation to depend on the exchange rate, so that the response of policymakers to the inflation rate might be smaller when the exchange rate is substantially over-valued.

These latter two issues cannot be addressed using a conventional linear monetary policy rule, as this assumes a constant proportional response to inflation and the exchange rate and assumes that the marginal response to one variable is independent of the values of other variables. These issues require a model in which the response to the exchange rate can differ depending on whether this is under-valued, over-valued or close to fundamentals. It also requires a model in which the response to inflation depends on the real exchange rate. We therefore use a multiple regime smooth transition model in which the behaviour of policymakers’ is allowed to
differ between 6 distinct regimes. In each regime, the behaviour of policymakers is described by a regime-specific augmented Taylor rule.

We address these issues using data for the UK since 1992, so our sample comprises the period of inflation targeting. We have a number of interesting findings. First, we find that Taylor rule models that include measures of real exchange rate misalignments outperform models that include the exchange rate. This suggests that the latter type of model is mispecified and that policymakers respond to real exchange rate misalignment rather than the real exchange rate itself. Second, we find that policymakers only respond to larger misalignments of the real exchange rate. Our estimates suggest that there is no response to the real exchange rate if exchange rates are under-valued by less than 4.4% or over-valued by less than 5.1%. As we discuss, these estimates imply that policymakers raised interest rates in response to under-valuations of the exchange rate in 1992-1993, 1995-1996 and reduced interest rates in response to an over-valuation in 1996-1998, but did not respond to the exchange rate at other times. Third, we find that the response of policymakers to inflation does depend on the exchange rate. The response is strongest when the exchange rate is significantly under-valued and weakest when it is over-valued. This implies that the increase in interest rates in response to excessive inflation is stronger in periods when exchange rate under-valuation intensifies inflationary pressures. To illustrate, although inflation was excessively high in 1995-1996 and in 1997-1998, the response to inflation was stronger in the first period
when the exchange was under-valued and weaker in the latter when the exchange rate was over-valued.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2) addresses the issue of whether policymakers respond to exchange rates or to misalignment, explaining our methodology and presenting estimates that suggest that the response is to misalignments. Section 3) addresses the remaining issues, explaining the multiple-regime model and presenting estimates. Section 4) summarises and concludes.

2) Monetary policy and real exchange rate misalignment

Existing empirical studies of the impact of exchange rate on monetary policy typically use an augmented Taylor rule, such as

\begin{equation}
\hat{i}^* = \hat{i} + \rho_\pi E_{t-1}(\pi - \pi^T)_{t+1} + \rho_f E_{t-1}i^f_{t+1} + \rho_y E_{t-1}y_{t+1} + \rho_e E_{t-1}e_t
\end{equation}

where \( i^* \) is the desired nominal interest rate, \( \hat{i} \) is the equilibrium nominal interest rate, \( \pi \) is the rate of inflation, \( \pi^T \) is the inflation target, \( y \) is the output gap, \( i^f \) is the foreign interest rate and \( e \) is the real exchange rate (defined as the real price of domestic currency in terms of foreign currency). The specification of (1) assumes that policymakers choose the interest rate at the beginning of period \( t \) using information available up to the end of period \( (t-1) \).
1). The assumption that policymakers respond to the inflation rate and output gap expected at time (t+1) but to the foreign interest rate and exchange rate expected at time t reflect the timings of these variables in our preferred empirical specification. Other studies do not include the real exchange rate (eg Adam et al, 2005) or the foreign interest rate (eg Chadha et al, 2004). Others, include other variables such as stock prices (e.g. Smets, 1997), house prices (e.g. Siklos et al, 2004) the spread between short- and long-term interest rates (e.g. Kristen, 2004) and money growth (e.g. Gerlach and Schnabel, 2000; Clarida et al, 1998). The relative shortness of our sample in the context of a multiple-regime non-linear model prevents us from including other variables, but hope to address this in future work.

Allowing for interest rate smoothing (which possibly arises for the reasons discussed in Woodford, 2003) by assuming that the actual nominal interest rate adjusts towards the desired rate by

\[ i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) i^*_t \]  

and invoking rational expectations, the augmented Taylor rule can be expressed as

\[ i_t = \rho i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) \hat{i} + \rho \pi_t (\pi^T)_{t+1} + \rho y_{t+1}^f + \rho e_i + \rho e_t \]
where $\varepsilon$ is an error term that contains the errors generated by replacing expected values of variables with actual values.

Estimates of this model are presented in column (i) of Table 1. We use UK data for the period 1992Q4-2005Q4. We measure $i$ using the 3-month Treasury Bill Rate, $\pi$ as the year-on-year proportional change in the retail price index, $y$ as the proportional deviation of output from its underlying (Hodrick-Prescott, 1997) trend, $i^f$ is the US 3-month effective funds rate and $e$ is the log of the real effective exchange rate. These definitions are similar to the existing literature, although Adam et al (2005) use both US and German interest rates (we also present estimates that use this rate), while Chadha et al (2004) measure the output gap using the share of labour in national income (Gali et al, 2001). Since 1997Q2 (when the Bank of England was given operational independence), the inflation target, $\pi^T$, is equal to 2.5 percent. Prior to that date, we construct the target as the centred two-year moving average of actual inflation (see also the discussion in Kesriyeli et al, 2006). Figure 1 plots the UK interest rate, UK inflation rate, UK output gap, the US interest rate and the German (Euro after 1999) interest rate.

We estimate that $\rho_\pi=1.82$, which is similar to other estimates, $\rho_y=1.31$, which is somewhat higher than in other studies, $\rho_f=0.42$, which is again similar to other studies (Adam et al, 2005, Table 1) summarises estimates of this parameter in other papers) and $\rho_e=0.17$, this latter being insignificant (Chadha et al, 2004 report a significant estimate of 0.06). There
is evidence of a structural break in the estimated relationship in 1997Q2 following the transfer of responsibility for interest rate decisions to the newly-formed monetary policy committee. This is consistent with the results in Adam et al (2005), who estimate different policy rules for the periods 1992-1997 and 1997-2003.

We next consider exchange rate misalignment. To do this, we estimate the model

\[ i_t = \rho_i i_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_i) \hat{\pi}_t + \rho_\pi (\pi - \pi^T)_{t+1} + \rho_y y_{t+1} + \rho_f i^F_t + \rho_e (e_t - e^*_t) + \epsilon_t \]

where \( e^* \) is the equilibrium real exchange rate and so \( e - e^* \) is real exchange rate misalignment. We calculate the equilibrium real exchange rate as the Hodrick-Prescott filtered value (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) of the real exchange rate and calculate exchange rate misalignment as the difference between the real exchange rate and its trend value. The resultant series is plotted in Figure 2, alongside the exchange rate. The narrative in Cobham (2006) provides a detailed description of movements in the exchange rate over this period and the concerns of policymakers about this, while Batini and Nelson (2005) provide a broader historical perspective. The exchange rate was under-valued between 1993-1996, over-valued from 1996-2000 and close to equilibrium thereafter. The effects of the appreciation that began in 1996 are initially marked but fall away quite rapidly. This is
consistent with the comments of Nickell (2005) cited above. Although a more satisfactory measure of real exchange rate misalignment might be derived from a more structural model, we would argue that the measure depicted in Figure 2 is plausible and will serve as a satisfactory first approximation. Column (ii) of Table 1 reports estimates of (4). The estimates of $\rho_\pi$ and $\rho_y$ are lower and more consistent with earlier studies, the estimate of $\rho_f$ is little changed, while $\rho_e=0.096$ and is now significant. Equation (4) has a lower standard error than (3). There is also no evidence of a break in the relationship in 1997, in contrast to (3). Columns (iii) and (iv) present estimates of (3) and (4) respectively using the German (Euro) rather than the US interest rate. The conclusions are similar, although these models fit the data less well than the corresponding estimates in columns (i) and (ii); column (iv) has a lower standard error than (iii) and, in contrast to (iii), has a significant exchange rate effect. The evidence in Table 1 suggests that policymakers may indeed respond to exchange rate misalignment rather than the exchange rate itself.

3) A more complex model

In this section we turn to the issues of whether policymakers only respond to larger exchange misalignments and whether the response to inflation depends on the exchange rate. Neither issue can be addressed
using an augmented Taylor rule like (4). In that, interest rates respond to all exchange misalignments irrespective of their size, while the marginal response of interest rates to inflation is always $\rho_z$ and so is not affected by the exchange rate.

We might address these issues using a three regime model in which policymakers followed a different Taylor-like linear policy rule depending on whether the exchange rate was over-valued, under-valued or close to fundamentals. We could conclude that policymakers only respond to larger misalignment if there was no response to the exchange rate in the “inner” regime where misalignment was low. Also, the response to inflation would depend on the exchange rate if this response differed between regimes. However this model may be too simple because there is also evidence that the behaviour of policymakers differs according to whether or not inflation is close to the inflation target (Martin and Milas, 2004).

We therefore use the following six-regime model

\[
\begin{align*}

i_t &= \rho i_{t-1} + (1-\rho)\left[\hat{\pi}_t + \rho^I \hat{i}^I_t + \theta_i^{eO} M_{4t} + \theta_i^{ei} M_{5t} + (1 - \theta_i^{eO} - \theta_i^{ei}) M_{6t}\right] \\
&+ (1 - \theta_i^{eO}) \left[\theta_i^{eO} M_{4t} + \theta_i^{ei} M_{5t} + (1 - \theta_i^{eO} - \theta_i^{ei}) M_{6t}\right] + \epsilon_i \\

\end{align*}
\]

where $M_{jb} = \rho_{j1}(\pi - \pi^*)_{t+1} + \rho_{j2}y_{t+1} + \rho_{j3}(e - e^*)$, for $j=1, ..., 6$; $\theta_i^{eO}$ is the probability, at the beginning of period $t$, that inflation in period $t+1$ will be in the inner inflation regime, where inflation is close to the inflation target, $\theta_i^{eO}$ is the
probability that the real exchange rate in period $t$ will be over-valued, while $\theta_{t}^{UL}$ is the probability it will be under-valued. In this model, the response of interest rates to the lagged and foreign interest rates is the same as in (4)\(^1\). But the response to inflation, output and the exchange rate is allowed to differ between regimes depending on the exchange rate and the inflation rate. $M_{1t}$ is a linear function that represents the behaviour of policymakers when inflation is expected to be close to target but the exchange rate is expected to be over-valued. In effect $M_{1t}$ is an augmented Taylor rule specific to this regime. $M_{2t}$ and $M_{3t}$ are augmented Taylor rules that describe the behaviour of policymakers in the regimes where inflation is expected to be close to target and the exchange rate is expected to be either under-valued or close to fundamentals respectively. Similarly, $M_{4t}$, $M_{5t}$ and $M_{6t}$ describe the behaviour of policymakers when inflation is not expected to be close to target and the exchange rate is expected to be over-valued, under-valued or close to fundamentals respectively. If $\rho_{1n} = \rho_{2n} = \rho_{3n}$ and $\rho_{4n} = \rho_{5n} = \rho_{6n}$ for each of $n = 1, 2, 3$, then the behaviour of policymakers does not differ between exchange rate regimes and so the model can be simplified to one with two regimes for the inflation rate. If $\rho_{1n} = \rho_{4n}$, $\rho_{2n} = \rho_{5n}$ and $\rho_{3n} = \rho_{6n}$ for each of $n = 1, 2, 3$, then the behaviour of policymakers does not differ between inflation regimes and the model can be simplified to one with three exchange rate regimes.

\(^1\) Preliminary estimates of more general models revealed that neither the response to the foreign interest rate nor the interest rate persistence differs between regimes.
regimes. If \( \rho_{1n} = \rho_{2n} = \rho_{3n} = \rho_{4n} = \rho_{5n} = \rho_{6n} \) for each of \( n = 1, 2, 3 \), the model simplifies to the Taylor rule in (4).

This model can be used to address the issues we are concerned with. If \( \rho_{33} = 0 \) and \( \rho_{63} = 0 \), then interest rates do not respond to the exchange rate when misalignments are small. If \( \rho_{11} \) differs from \( \rho_{21} \) and \( \rho_{31} \) and \( \rho_{41} \) differ from \( \rho_{51} \) and \( \rho_{61} \), then the response to inflation depends on the exchange rate misalignment; there is a larger response when the exchange rate is under-valued if \( \rho_{21} \) is larger than both \( \rho_{11} \) and \( \rho_{31} \), and \( \rho_{51} \) is larger than both \( \rho_{41} \) and \( \rho_{61} \).

We make the model operational by assuming

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta^\iota_i &= \Pr\{\tau^\iota \leq (\pi - \pi^T)_{t+1} \leq \tau^\iota\} = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\gamma^\iota (\pi_{t+1} - \pi^T)_{t+1}}}, \\
\theta^{O_i} &= \Pr\{(e_i - \epsilon^*_i < \phi^O\} = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\gamma^O (e_i - \epsilon^*_i) - \phi^O}} \\
\theta^{U_i} &= \Pr\{(e_i - \epsilon^*_i < \phi^U\} = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\gamma^U (e_i - \epsilon^*_i) - \phi^U}}
\end{align*}
\]

Equation (6) defines the inner inflation regime as the probability that inflation is no less than \( \tau^\iota \) percentage points below the target or no more than \( \tau^U \) percentage points above, where we note that these regime boundaries may be asymmetric. The probability is modelled using a quadratic logistic function (Jansen and Teräsvirta, 1996). Equations (7) and (8) state that the
economy is in the over-valued (resp. under-valued) exchange rate regime if
the exchange rate is over-valued by more than \( \phi^o \) percentage points (resp.
under-valued by more than \( \phi^u \) percentage points). These regime boundaries
may also be asymmetric. The smoothness parameters \( \gamma^\sigma \), \( \gamma^o \) and \( \gamma^u > 0 \)
determine the smoothness of the transition regimes. We follow Granger and
Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) in making \( \gamma^\sigma \) dimension-free by
dividing it by the variance of \( \pi_{t+1} - \pi^T_{t+1} \) and making \( \gamma^o \) and \( \gamma^u \) dimension-
free by dividing them by the standard deviation of \( e_i - e_i^* \).

Clearly, estimating such a complex model on a relatively limited span
of data is challenging. Fortunately, we were able to impose a series of
restrictions that simplified estimation greatly. These were (i) interest rates
only respond to output in the inner inflation and exchange rate regimes (this
implies \( \rho_{12} = \rho_{22} = \rho_{42} = \rho_{52} = \rho_{62} = 0 \)); (ii) there is no response to inflation in
the inner inflation regime (this implies \( \rho_{11} = \rho_{21} = \rho_{31} = 0 \)); (iii) there is no
response to the exchange rate in the inner exchange rate regime (this implies
\( \rho_{33} = \rho_{63} = 0 \)); (iv) the response of interest rates to the real exchange rate is
independent of the rate of inflation (this implies \( \rho_{13} = \rho_{23} \) and \( \rho_{43} = \rho_{53} \)).

Estimates of the resulting model are presented in column (i) of Table 2.
The standard error is substantially lower than for the Taylor rule models
reported in Table 1, so this approach gives a much better fit to the data. We
estimate the regime boundaries to be \(-0.522\) and \(0.261\) for the inflation

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regime and −5.11 and 4.37 for the exchange rate regimes. These imply that
the economy is in the inner inflation regime when inflation is expected to fall
between $\pi_{t+1}^T -0.522$ and $\pi_{t+1}^T +0.261$ percent. Since the inflation target was
2.5% from 1997Q2 onwards, the upper boundary of 2.761% to the inner
inflation regime is closer to the inflation target than the lower boundary of
1.978%. This implies a deflationary bias to monetary policy, confirming the
findings of Martin and Milas (2004). The estimated boundaries to the
exchange rate regimes imply that the economy is in the over-valued (resp.
under-valued) exchange rate regime when the real exchange rate is over-
valued by more than 5.11% (resp under-valued by more than 4.37%). Both
inflation and exchange rate boundaries are asymmetric based on the
statistical tests reported at the bottom of Table 2. ²

There is no response of interest rates to the real exchange rate in the
inner exchange rate regime. We therefore conclude that policymakers do not
respond to the real exchange rate when this is over-valued by less than
5.11% or under-valued by less than 4.37%. We also find that the response to
inflation does depend on the exchange rate. Interest rates do not respond to
the inflation rate in the inner inflation regime, when inflation is expected to be

² The smoothness parameters $\gamma^\pi$, $\gamma^{eO}$ and $\gamma^{eU}$ reported in Table 2, are imprecisely
estimated. Teräsvirta (1994) and van Dijk et al (2002) point out that this should not be
interpreted as evidence against the model's validity. Accurate estimation of $\gamma^\pi$, $\gamma^{eO}$ and $\gamma^{eU}$
is problematic because it requires many observations in the immediate neighbourhood of the
regime boundaries. Furthermore, large changes in the smoothness parameters have a small
impact on the shape of the functions (6), (7) and (8), which implies that estimates of $\gamma^\pi$, $\gamma^{eO}$
and $\gamma^{eU}$ do not have to be precise (van Dijk et al, 2002).
between the $\pi_{t+1}^T - 0.522$ and $\pi_{t+1}^T + 0.261$ percent boundaries (between 1.978% and 2.761% from 1997Q2 onwards). In the outer inflation regime, the response to inflation is stronger when the exchange rate is in the under-valued exchange rate regime (i.e. $\rho_{31} = 3.047$) and weaker in the over-valued exchange rate regime (i.e. $\rho_{41} = 1.269$).

Column (ii) of Table 2 reports estimates of the same model but where the German (Euro) is used in place of the US interest rate. These estimates lead to similar conclusions. In this model, policymakers do not respond to the real exchange rate when this is over-valued by less than 5.86% or under-valued by less than 4.96%. Policymakers do not respond to the inflation rate in the inner inflation regime, when inflation is expected to be between $\pi_{t+1}^T - 0.66$ and $\pi_{t+1}^T + 0.194$ percent (between 1.84% and 2.694% from 1997Q2 onwards). The response of interest rates to inflation is again stronger when the real exchange rate is under-valued.

The implications of these estimates for the interpretation of recent UK monetary policy are explored in figures 3 and 4. Figure 3) depicts real exchange rate misalignment and the estimated boundaries. Our estimates suggest that policymakers raised interest rates in response to under-valuations of the exchange rate in 1992-1993, 1995-1996 and reduced interest rates in response to an over-valuation in 1996-1998, but did not respond to the exchange rate at other times. Policymakers did not respond
to the exchange rate between 1998-2005 as real exchange rate misalignment remained within the regime boundaries. By contrast, a Taylor rule model would imply frequent small interest rate adjustments in this period. Figure 4) depicts the response of interest rates to inflation implied by the estimates of column (I) of table 2), calculated as:

\[ \rho_{\pi t} = (1 - \theta_i^p) \{ \theta_i^{\rho o} \rho_{41} + \theta_i^{\rho u} \rho_{51} + (1 - \theta_i^{\rho o} - \theta_i^{\rho u}) \rho_{61} \} \]

To illustrate, although inflation was excessively high in 1995-1996 and in 1997-1998, the response to inflation was stronger in the first period when the exchange was under-valued and weaker in the latter when the exchange rate was over-valued.

4) Conclusions
This paper has estimated a flexible non-linear monetary policy rule for the UK to examine the response of policymakers to the real exchange rate. Three main findings emerge. First, policymakers respond to real exchange rate misalignments rather than to the exchange rate itself. Second, policymakers ignore small deviations of the exchange rate; they only respond to real exchange under-valuations of more than 4% and over-valuations of more than 5%. Third, the response of policymakers to inflation depends on the
exchange rate. The response to inflation is smaller when the exchange rate is over-valued and larger when it is under-valued.

Our work can be extended in several ways. We might estimate our model using data for different countries in order to investigate the impact of the exchange rate on monetary policy and assess whether the response of monetary policy to inflation depends on the exchange rate. We might also develop a more structural model of the exchange rate and examine its effect on the monetary policy rule. We intend to address these issues in future work.
References


Table 1: Estimates of Augmented Taylor rules (1992Q4 2005Q4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(i)</th>
<th>(ii)</th>
<th>(iii)</th>
<th>(iv)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model with US interest rate and exchange rate regressors</td>
<td>Model with US interest rate and exchange rate misalignment regressors</td>
<td>Model with German (Euro) interest rate and exchange rate regressors</td>
<td>Model with German (Euro) interest rate and exchange rate misalignment regressors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{i}$</td>
<td>1.044 (0.473)</td>
<td>0.691 (0.041)</td>
<td>0.545 (0.273)</td>
<td>0.487 (0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.776 (0.315)</td>
<td>0.820 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.872 (0.041)</td>
<td>0.844 (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_\pi$</td>
<td>1.820 (0.320)</td>
<td>1.762 (0.126)</td>
<td>1.713 (0.539)</td>
<td>1.839 (0.538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_y$</td>
<td>1.311 (0.336)</td>
<td>0.911 (0.140)</td>
<td>1.662 (0.872)</td>
<td>1.090 (0.488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_f$</td>
<td>0.417 (0.047)</td>
<td>0.380 (0.021)</td>
<td>0.193 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.311 (0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_e$</td>
<td>0.168 (0.112)</td>
<td>0.096 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.103 (0.074)</td>
<td>0.056 (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-\hat{R}^2$</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. validity</td>
<td>[0.98]</td>
<td>[0.98]</td>
<td>[0.99]</td>
<td>[0.93]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normality</td>
<td>[0.73]</td>
<td>[0.61]</td>
<td>[0.91]</td>
<td>[0.67]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break-mpc</td>
<td>[0.01]</td>
<td>[0.12]</td>
<td>[0.06]</td>
<td>[0.07]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
(a) Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the estimates. Numbers in square brackets are the probability values of the test statistics. Inst.validity is the p-value of J test of the exogeneity of the instruments, normality is the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test for normality of the estimate residuals, while break-mpc is the p-value of a Chow test for a structural break in 1997Q2 following the formation of the Monetary Policy committee.
(b) A constant and up to 6 lags of all variables are used as instruments for the estimates.
Table 2: Estimates of 6-regime monetary policy rules (1992Q4 2005Q4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/regime</th>
<th>(i) Model with US interest rate regressor</th>
<th>(ii) Model with German (Euro) interest rate regressor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\hat{i}$</td>
<td>Constant 1.285 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.796 (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>Lagged interest rate 0.633 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.717 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_f$</td>
<td>Foreign interest rate 0.411 (0.010)</td>
<td>0.271 (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_1$ Inner Inflation, Exchange rate Over-valued</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_1$</td>
<td>Exchange rate 0.075 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.147 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_2$ Inner Inflation, Exchange rate Under-valued</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_2$</td>
<td>Exchange rate 0.075 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.147 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_3$ Inner Inflation, Inner Exchange rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_3$</td>
<td>Output gap 0.896 (0.205)</td>
<td>1.141 (0.433)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_4$ Outer Inflation, Exchange rate Over-valued</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_4$</td>
<td>Inflation 1.269 (0.087)</td>
<td>1.569 (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_5$</td>
<td>Exchange rate 0.027 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_5$ Outer Inflation, Exchange rate Under-valued</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_6$</td>
<td>Inflation 3.047 (0.390)</td>
<td>2.167 (0.868)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_7$</td>
<td>Exchange rate 0.027 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_6$ Outer Inflation, Inner Exchange rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_8$</td>
<td>Inflation 1.468 (0.062)</td>
<td>1.233 (0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^L$</td>
<td>-0.522 (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.660 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^U$</td>
<td>0.261 (0.071)</td>
<td>0.194 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^O$</td>
<td>-5.112 (0.107)</td>
<td>-5.863 (1.874)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi^U$</td>
<td>4.368 (0.248)</td>
<td>4.962 (1.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma^E$</td>
<td>5.525 (19.086)</td>
<td>22.981 (48.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma^{EO}$</td>
<td>20.005 (79.543)</td>
<td>89.598 (579.543)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma^{EU}$</td>
<td>10.876 (132.043)</td>
<td>332.755 (330.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\overline{R}^2$</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard error</td>
<td>0.262</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inst. Validity</td>
<td>[0.98]</td>
<td>[0.98]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normality</td>
<td>[0.14]</td>
<td>[0.63]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis</td>
<td>Test Statistic</td>
<td>p-value 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_0: \rho_{11} = \rho_{31}$</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_0: \rho_{41} = \rho_{31}$</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_0: \rho_{31} = \rho_{41}$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_0: \tau^i = -\tau^j$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_0: \phi^i = -\phi^j$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** See the notes of Table 1.

- $^a$ Test of common output effects.
- $^b$ Test of common exchange rate effects.
- $^c$ Test of common inflation effects.
- $^d$ Test of symmetric inflation bounds.
- $^e$ Test of symmetric exchange rate bounds.
Figure 1: Plots of TBR, inflation, output gap, US interest rate and EU interest rate
Figure 2: Plot of the real exchange rate and the real exchange rate gap

Note: LHS axis: measurement units of the real exchange rate (RER). RHS axis: measurement units of the real exchange rate gap (RER gap).
Figure 3: The real exchange rate gap and estimated boundaries

Note: The lower bound equals –5.11% and the upper bound equals 4.37%.
Figure 4: The response of interest rates to inflation

Note: LHS axis: measurement units of the inflation impact (p_impact) calculated as:
\[ \rho_{zt} = (1 - \theta_t^e) \{ \theta_t^e \rho_{31} + \theta_t^{eU} \rho_{51} + (1 - \theta_t^{eO} - \theta_t^{eT}) \rho_{61} \} \]
based on the estimates reported in column (i) of Table 2. RHS axis: measurement units of the UK Treasury Bill rate (TBR) in %. 

\[ \text{LHS axis: measurement units of the inflation impact (} p_{\text{impact}} \text{) calculated as: } \rho_{zt} = (1 - \theta_t^e) \{ \theta_t^e \rho_{31} + \theta_t^{eU} \rho_{51} + (1 - \theta_t^{eO} - \theta_t^{eT}) \rho_{61} \} \text{ based on the estimates reported in column (i) of Table 2. RHS axis: measurement units of the UK Treasury Bill rate (TBR) in %}. \]