Much has been made of Nietzsche’s esotericism, or the extent to which he tried to hide his true teaching. Nietzsche himself is unclear on the subject. As he writes in *The Gay Science*, “one does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just as surely *not* to be understood.”¹ There are countless such quotations. Yet inscribed at the outset of *Ecce Homo*, his intellectual autobiography, is this rather startling statement: “Here me! For I am such and such a person. Above all, do not mistake me for someone else.”² Nietzsche is anything but clear on the extent to which he wants to be understood.

Before examining the nature of Nietzsche’s esotericism, it is necessary to consider what is meant by the term, irrespective of his philosophy. First, it is important to note that I do not mean esoteric in the historical sense of Western esotericism—that is, Rosicrucianism, Freemasonry, Kabbalah, *etc*. Nietzsche does not speak of them in any of his writings, and would probably be hostile to these mystical traditions. Nevertheless, esotericism has another strain, one related to a particular style of writing, and it is from this perspective that we should consider him. As a trained philologist, he was a close reader of texts, and consequently, he became a careful writer.
Strauss, the writer responsible for most of the current discourse on esotericism, has done much to detail what it means and the circumstances under which it is practised. Esotericism, or “writing between the lines,” occurs in times that are less free, Strauss proposes. It is his contention that an esoteric book contains two separate and distinct teachings: one obvious, popular, and more traditional teaching and the true one, which is hidden to all but the most careful readers. Since the true teaching is often controversial or even incendiary, it is not typically found in obvious places, such as introductions or conclusions.

According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s “grand style” emphasises the will to power, artistry, and the necessity of creation. Heidegger’s conclusion that Nietzsche is an esoteric writer, however, is less persuasive. “For every great thinker always thinks one jump more originally than he directly speaks,” Heidegger writes. “Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by him.” Heidegger’s reading is fairly simple: great writers are esoteric; Nietzsche is a great writer; therefore, Nietzsche is an esoteric writer.

Since Heidegger, Nietzsche’s esotericism has mostly been taken for granted, to the extent that Nietzsche might call it a scholarly, if not philosophic, prejudice. Nehemas, who wrote one of the only book-length treatments of Nietzsche’s manner of philosophising, refers to “Nietzsche’s self-aggrandizing, aristocratic, esoteric manner,” without giving an adequate explanation as to why he sees him as an esoteric writer. The best Nehemas can do is suggest that his use of aphorisms is proof of his esotericism. But brevity is not, necessarily, ambiguity or obfuscation.

Note, however, that although Derrida mostly agrees with Heidegger on Nietzsche’s manner of philosophizing he, at least provisionally, comes to a very different conclusion on what is to be done with Nietzsche. Heidegger assumes that his style obscures his true intention,
whereas Derrida is sceptical about whether any intention exists. Heidegger expects interpretations that speak for Nietzsche; Derrida suggests that interpreters speak in place of him, because we would be silent or confounded otherwise. Even those who agree on Nietzsche’s esotericism disagree as to what it means for readers and would-be interpreters.

Lampert, a careful reader of Nietzsche (and Strauss), approaches the question more directly. Lampert agrees with Strauss’s definition of esotericism, but claims that the tradition of esotericism ends with Nietzsche. “A Nietzschean history of philosophy,” Lampert submits, “brings the old esoteric practices into the open—it ends them by bringing them into open and it ends them for precisely the same reason that philosophy first took up esoteric practices: to defend the place of reason in the world.” Lampert notes that esotericism and the more recent turn from esotericism are explained by the need to save philosophy. Esotericism was beneficial when philosophers were not free, as Strauss suggested, but now philosophy is threatened again, this time by its reluctance or inability to show itself to the world. The first, and most important, part of Nietzsche’s project is to emphasise the solitude, honesty, courage, and sympathy—that are needed to restore philosophy’s vitality and relevance.

Lampert is certainly correct in insisting that, according to Nietzsche, democracy gave rise to a new kind of esotericism in philosophy. It did not end simply because freedom of speech has become the norm. Yet Lampert goes on to claim, as Nehemas implied, that esotericism survives in Nietzsche through the aphorism—“an art of writing whose brevity, whose thriftiness, does as little as possible for the reader.” It also survives in “enthusiasm,” which Nietzsche describes as “successfully appearing more stupid than you are,” or what Lampert calls “courtesy” and relates to “the pathos of distance.” Finally, “esotericism survives in Nietzsche in a third and most fundamental way,” Lampert contends. “Nature loves to hide…[.] Such esotericism is
neither chosen nor surmountable. It is not a lie for our supposed good; it is the ineluctable hiddenness in the heart of things.”

Although Lampert’s take on Nietzsche’s esotericism is more sophisticated than what we find in Heidegger, Nehemas, and Derrida, Lampert is wrong to call it esotericism. Nowhere does Nietzsche say that he uses aphorisms to limit his audience. Lampert also misconstrues the “pathos of distance” and Nietzsche’s view of courtesy. Nietzsche valued solitude, to be sure, but only as a temporary mode of existence. Recall that even his Zarathustra had to emerge from his mountaintop retreat. What is more, that “nature loves to hide” is not esoteric in any sense of the term. Lampert’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of nature is superior to most others—with the possible exception of Schacht—but to say that nature is ambiguous in Nietzsche’s writing is not to say that Nietzsche is an esoteric writer. Nietzsche does his utmost to reveal the illusive qualities of nature, but the conclusions he draws cannot be more specific than his view of nature will allow.

Clearly, the treatment of Nietzsche’s esotericism leaves something to be desired. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to make a case against Nietzsche’s esotericism. To write of esotericism and to allude to one’s own penchant for it is not the same as writing in an esoteric manner. For evidence of Nietzsche’s esotericism, we will look first, as Strauss recommends, to his prefaces and epilogues—that is, the most exposed parts of his books. If Nietzsche is an esoteric writer, his prefaces will show him as a cautious writer who does little for his readers. After careful examination, however, we find that these parts are where Nietzsche is clearest. His use of the extremities of his books to frame the content within is hardly the mode of an esoteric writer in the Straussian sense. Although Nietzsche often alludes to his esoteric “mask,” he does as much as possible to aid his readers.
The Birth of the Preface

The preface to *The Birth of Tragedy* is a dedication of sorts, in that it names Wagner as its recipient. Nietzsche’s excitement at the work is related, at least in part, to Wagner receiving it. *The Birth of Tragedy* is more than just an ode, however, for “a seriously German problem is faced here.” It is not directed at everyone, but to serious readers. *The Birth of Tragedy* was written with Wagner in mind. Wagner is Nietzsche’s principal audience, for he is perhaps the only one able to understand the book, Nietzsche suggests; but this does not mean that Nietzsche intends to exclude all others. The preface also contains a brief statement on the book’s thesis, that “art represents the highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life, in the sense of that man to whom, as my sublime predecessor on this path, I wish to dedicate this essay.” Here, Nietzsche introduces the theme of the text and his debt to Wagner in the same sentence.

The strikingly traditional nature of the original preface is matched by the peculiarity with which Nietzsche amended *The Birth of Tragedy*. He added to it “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism” when it was republished in 1886, the same year in which *Beyond Good and Evil* first appeared. The addition serves, in effect, as a second preface, or, as Nietzsche calls it, a “belated preface (or postscript).” Walter Kaufmann writes that new preface “is among the finest things [Nietzsche] ever wrote. Perhaps no other great writer has written a comparable preface to one of his own works. Certainly this self-criticism is far superior to most of the criticisms others have directed against *The Birth of Tragedy*.”

Nietzsche uses the first part of “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” to perform two general functions. First, it allows him to explain his dissatisfaction with the original text. “Whatever may be at the bottom of this questionable book,” he writes, “it must have been an exceedingly
significant and fascinating question, and deeply personal at that.”21 He goes on to describe *The Birth of Tragedy* as a “strange and almost inaccessible” book.22 Nietzsche admits that his first book confuses even him.

The second, and perhaps more interesting, point concerns the reason why *The Birth of Tragedy* is found so wanting by its author. It appears, Nietzsche confesses, that he was too far removed from world events while he was writing it. He calls the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) an “exciting time,” but laments that while it was going on, he had been sitting “somewhere in an Alpine nook.”23 *The Birth of Tragedy* was, he confesses, written “in spite of” its time. Moreover, he explains that he finished *The Birth of Tragedy* only after having recovered from an illness that had plagued him throughout the course of the project. The thesis of *The Birth of Tragedy* and the remedy it proposes—namely, Wagner—cannot reflect a concern for the health of a culture, for they emerged from a sick and solitary man. Moreover, Nietzsche laments, philosophy is a task best left to those with greater experience and a greater perspective from which to work. In sum, philosophy is not a proper vocation for the young.

Nietzsche also uses this occasion to note the relative success of his first book. However much he would later find *The Birth of Tragedy* wanting, “the best minds of the time” found it agreeable when it was published.24 If his first book is valuable at all, he suggests, it is its glimpse into the minds that find it agreeable—again, Wagner. It is not, however, of much use in understanding how Nietzsche thinks, unless we are charting his intellectual development. He has surpassed the teaching found in his first book and, with it, the greatest minds of his time.

Nietzsche ends this section by referring to this change in his philosophy. Where *The Birth of Tragedy* was an attempt to examine science through art, his later philosophy, he suggests, treats art with the same suspicion and judges it accordingly.25 Because “the problem of science
cannot be recognized in the context of science,” Nietzsche had originally used art to examine it. Having discovered, through his familiarity with Wagner, that artists too can be corrupted, Nietzsche turned to life as the standard by which science and art—and philosophy, too, for that matter—ought to be judged.

In addition to its message and its style, Nietzsche also disparages *The Birth of Tragedy* for its intended audience. He “sought to exclude right from the beginning,” he admits, “the [profane crowd] of ‘the educated’ even more than ‘the mass’ or ‘folk.’”26 Rather than trying to court intellectuals or to see them as potential followers, he treated almost everyone, with the obvious exception of Wagner, with equal disdain. This strategy, corrected in his later works and dramatised in the Prologue to *Zarathustra*, meant that Nietzsche was able to speak in an elevated tone, hone his message, and treat the greatest subjects without fear of being misunderstood. For Nietzsche, philosophy means attending to his philosophy, knowing full well that, if done properly, an audience would find him.

Although Nietzsche admits to paying too much attention to his audience, this is one of the areas where *The Birth of Tragedy* succeeded. It had, he claims, “a knack for seeking out fellow-rhapsodizers and for luring them on to new secret paths and dancing places.”27 What interested readers, he determined, was the fact that there lay underneath the text some “unknown God”—his Dionysus. It was to this theme that he would return in his later writings. *The Birth of Tragedy* appealed to readers who, like Nietzsche himself, were in search of a new God, one that would replace the dead Christian deity.

To answer the question “What is Dionysian?” Nietzsche intimates, is to answer the question “What, seen in the perspective of life, is the significance of morality?”28 This is a perspective absent from *The Birth of Tragedy*. “Already in the preface addressed to Richard
Wagner,” Nietzsche laments, “art, and not morality, is presented as the true *metaphysical* activity of man.”29 We need not read *The Birth of Tragedy* in its entirety to see where it falls short. If *The Birth of Tragedy* hints at elements of his later philosophy, in “An Attempt at Self-Criticism” Nietzsche directs the reader to *Beyond Good and Evil*, the place where this sentiment is expressed most fully.30

That Nietzsche’s philosophy changed is most apparent in the “careful and hostile silence with which Christianity is treated throughout the whole book.”31 Christianity, Nietzsche adds in the new preface, forces morality to become absolute and “relegates art, *every* art, to the realm of *lies*; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and damns art.”32 It was Christianity that taught Nietzsche the value of life as a standard for truth and art. If Nietzsche is silent about Christianity in *The Birth of Tragedy*, he overcompensates in “An Attempt at Self-Criticism.” The greatest failure of *The Birth of Tragedy* is not that it failed to put forth the highest elements of his teaching, Nietzsche tells us; rather, it fails to take seriously the threat to life posed by Christianity. When committing *The Birth of Tragedy* to paper, “the Antichrist” had yet to find his antipodes. If *The Birth of Tragedy* succeeded at all, it was that it made Nietzsche realise that the problem of science is more rightfully a problem of morality. It was only after the process, or the experience, of writing his first book that Nietzsche was able to appreciate the origin and the extent of the threat that Christian morality posed to Western culture. In short, *The Birth of Tragedy* should be read for the questions it poses, not for the answers it provides.

In the final section of “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism” Nietzsche responds to those who view him as a nihilist and brand his philosophy as dangerous. Nietzsche recommends that such objectors “ought to learn the art of *this-worldly* comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh, my
young friends, if you are hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then perhaps, as laughers, you may someday dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil—metaphysics in front.”

Christianity is the problem, Nietzsche reminds us. A philosophy of the future must reject Christian morality and its view of the afterworld.

Nietzsche concludes by invoking “that Dionysian monster” Zarathustra to teach the same lesson in a different, and slightly more positive, way. He quotes from “On the Higher Man,” a speech from the Fourth Part of Zarathustra, where Zarathustra praises the virtues of laughter and of not taking oneself, or one’s teaching, too seriously. “This crown of the laughter, the rose-wreath crown: to you, my brothers, I throw this crown. Laughter I have pronounced holy: you higher men, learn—to laugh!”

It is telling that the part Nietzsche quotes begins a story of failure. It is here that Zarathustra recalls his first attempt at teaching and how poorly it turned out. The same is true of the Wagnerian Birth of Tragedy. “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism” artfully and tactfully directs the reader from Wagner and The Birth of Tragedy to Dionysus and Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

Beyond Wagner

If The Birth of Tragedy points directly to Nietzsche’s friend and teacher, Richard Wagner, so too does The Case of Wagner. While The Birth of Tragedy praises him in the dedication, The Case of Wagner places him in the title and, indeed, as the recipient of vicious attacks. In this sense, they are opposite books. The Birth of Tragedy begins Nietzsche’s career with a gracious nod to Wagner; The Case of Wagner closes a chapter in Nietzsche’s intellectual development with an unmistakable break with him.
On the main title page, which appears before the preface, Nietzsche includes, as he does so often, an epigram. It is a variation of Horace that appears in Latin: “Through what is laughable say what is somber.” Nietzsche is warning the reader that the themes of the book are to be taken seriously. Certainly that is what Nietzsche means by “somber.” What he means by laughable is less clear. He may mean that his treatment of the themes therein may be treated humorously. This interpretation would be consistent with his emphasis on “golden laughter” and a “crown of laughter.” As he writes in the Preface, “Interspersed with many jokes, I bring up a matter that is no joke.” Nietzsche might also mean that Wagner himself, as the subject of the essay and the vehicle for his philosophy, is subject to derision.

The Preface itself is exceptional in its clarity. Wagner, Nietzsche explains, “is merely one of [his] sicknesses.” The problem with Wagner, he says, is his affinity with modernity, in particular modern morality. Nietzsche moves quickly from discussing his break with Wagner to the problem of morality. For Nietzsche, no transition is necessary, for the two are interchangeable in his eyes. His charge that “morality negates life” is directed at Wagner. For Nietzsche, modernity means Wagner. To be post-modern, in the most general sense of the term, is to be post-Wagner.

Nietzsche also uses the Preface to reiterate one of the most prominent themes in his writings: being a philosopher means speaking to, if not moving beyond, the spirit of the times. This is especially true in times of decadence, as Nietzsche labels modernity. This is not to say that philosophy is a wholly internal process; even when done in solitude, philosophy demands action, be it creation or destruction. In The Case of Wagner, it is the latter. The problem of modernity is solved by first attacking Wagner.
However much Wagner is Nietzsche’s intended target, Nietzsche is by no means angry with his friend and former teacher. “When in this essay I assert the proposition that Wagner is harmful,” Nietzsche writes, “I wish no less to assert for whom he is nevertheless indispensable—for the philosopher.” If Wagner is modernity, then a philosopher needs to overcome him. Nietzsche is grateful, for Wagner is pure in his decadence and his representation of all that is modern. If Wagner is a sickness, then Nietzsche knows the cure, for Nietzsche heals, as he did with himself. And Nietzsche could heal us, too, if we let him. Wagner is a placeholder for modernity, but Nietzsche is irreplaceable. We should be grateful to Nietzsche, he himself suggests, for he has shown us the path from Wagner, from the decadence of modernity, a means to escape our own decadence. We “must first become a Wagnerian;” only then can we become Nietzschean. The difficulty of Nietzsche’s break with his former teacher is indicated by the manner in which he concludes The Case of Wagner: he ends it with two postscripts and an epilogue. It is a short book, and these pages are nearly half of it.

Nietzsche ends the main text of The Case of Wagner with a defense of art and, with it, a defence of what he calls philosophy. But Nietzsche does not end here. The Postscript begins with him referring to the “seriousness” of how he ended the work. For some reason it is this seriousness that “permits” Nietzsche to add the Postscript, or at least a postscript of this sort. It is not immediately clear whether Nietzsche intends to continue in this tone, or if, bothered by the seriousness of his final words on Wagner, he wishes to end on a note more consistent with his fondness for laughter and a “gay science.” Soon it becomes clear that the former is the case.

The subtitle of the Postscript ought to be “One pays heavily for being one of Wagner’s disciples,” for Nietzsche uses this phrase five times in as many pages. It is a rare instance—“Thus spoke Zarathustra” is the most notable exception—of Nietzsche’s style being predicated
on a repetition of words. In its first and second usage, it is the Germans who have paid for their discipleship. Although they had initially resisted Wagner, the Germans, “the delayers par excellence in history, are today the most retarded civilized nation in Europe.” If they are to be admired at all, it is for their youth, not their overall health or character.

What of Wagner’s influence on culture? It too has suffered. Wagner brought forth “the presumption of the layman, the art-idiot.” Similarly, Wagner made others view education and training as superfluous or even harmful. It was replaced with a “faith in genius or, to speak plainly, by impudent dilettantism.” Worse yet, Wagnerianism meant “theatocracy—the nonsense of a faith in the precedence of the theater, in the right of the theater to lord it over the arts, over art.” For Nietzsche, the theatre is to serve art, for theatre is always a slave to the mass. In sum, Wagner brought egalitarianism into art and levelled high culture with his moralism. If god is dead, Wagner dragged his corpse into the orchestra pit.

The sentiment of the Postscript is curious given what Nietzsche says of Wagner in the Preface. In the Preface, Nietzsche is grateful; in the Postscript, Nietzsche speaks as a lover scorned. Yet Nietzsche does not claim that he has paid for his discipleship. The Germans, culture, the spirit, the young, and women have paid for following Wagner, but Nietzsche is grateful. Nietzsche is not a disciple who paid a great price; rather, Wagner was, for Nietzsche, a means to greatness and health. This should not stop others—the Germans, proponents of culture, the young, and women—from despising Wagner. And if they do turn from Wagner, there is an alternative path. This path, Nietzsche claims, leads them not from Wagner to Nietzsche, but from Wagner back to themselves.

Absent from this account are philosophers—most notably, Nietzsche himself. When he does comment on the effect that Wagner had on him, he returns to the grateful posture of the
Preface. When writing of Wagner’s *Parsifal*, Nietzsche remarks that he wishes that he had written it. Nietzsche can be grateful, but everyone else should be angry. That is something that should not be forgotten—to the extent that Nietzsche tacks it on to the end of the main text.

Nietzsche recognizes that the tone of the Postscript is subject to confusion, so much so that he adds another one. “My letter, it seems, it open to a misunderstanding,” he writes. It is not clear whether he is referring to the entire text or merely to the Postscript. In either case, *The Case of Wagner* is incomplete. Nietzsche is concerned that his gratitude will be misconstrued. Of course nothing would have stopped Nietzsche from editing the text to make this point clear. However, he chose to elucidate this fact in pages added to the main text—pages left out in the open for the reader to discover. Hence the problem is not with Nietzsche or the book he had just finished; the problem is with his audience, and it demands a unique solution. Nietzsche is a careful writer who demands attentive readers. Nietzsche will do his utmost to ensure that they understand him, even if that means that he must leave them with two postscripts and an epilogue.

Nietzsche also uses this opportunity to clarify his attack on Wagner and his view of music in general. Wagner may exemplify the decadence of the times, Nietzsche argues, but he is certainly not its cause. His genius was in accelerating the decline. Others hesitated, but Wagner did not. The Second Postscript is a curious addition to the text, if Nietzsche’s intent was to clarify his gratitude toward Wagner. While he did elevate Wagner, he did it indirectly by attacking others—most notably Brahms. By presenting Wagner in this relatively positive light, he pushes readers toward him. At the same time, Nietzsche reiterates his claim that Wagner “was courage, the will, *conviction* in corruption.” He wants everyone to know Wagner’s decadence; only then can they know Nietzsche. Nevertheless, he concludes the Second Postscript optimistically, with an appeal to what is left of cultural greatness.
If two postscripts were not enough, Nietzsche adds an epilogue. Clearly, *The Case of Wagner* finds Nietzsche not knowing how to say farewell. It is an opportunity, he notes, for us to “recover our breath” and for him to “wash his hands,” after having dealt with someone such as Wagner.\(^5\) For Nietzsche, taking a step back from Wagner means first summarising what he means by the term *modern*. Every age embraces the virtues of ascent or decline, he explains; and modernity is an age of weakness and decline. Nowhere is this more evident than when examining Christianity and its opposite. Wagner’s fault is his inability to appreciate the difference between Christianity and master morality. “Noble morality, master morality, conversely, is rooted in a triumphant Yes said to oneself—it is self-affirmation, self-glorification of life,” Nietzsche writes.\(^5\) “All of beautiful, all of great art belongs here: the essence of both is gratitude.”\(^5\) It is the same gratitude that marks his own philosophy, he suggests. His is beautiful and great art; its essence is gratitude toward Wagner.

While presenting his view on morality, Nietzsche makes a reference to *On the Genealogy of Morals* in a rare footnote to the main text. It is in the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche claims, that the problem of morality was first detailed: “perhaps there is no more decisive turning point in the history of our understanding of religion and morality.”\(^5\) At the same time, he declares, “This book, my touchstone of what belongs to me, has the good fortune of being accessible only to the most high-minded and severe spirits: the rest lack ears for it.”\(^5\) He virtually dares readers to seek it out.

*The Case of Wagner* is not Nietzsche’s final say on Richard Wagner, however. He thought enough of Wagner, and indeed of his break with him, to put together *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, which was composed of parts collected from his earlier works. Nietzsche wanted there
to be no doubt that, however much *The Birth of Tragedy* stood as a testament to Wagner’s influence, his own later works break from Wagner in a clear, decisive manner.

Moreover, Nietzsche illustrates that his break with Wagner was anything but recent, noting that it began shortly after the initial publication of *The Birth of Tragedy*. As R. J. Hollingdale points out, this would have marked 1878 as the year of the break, five years before Wagner died, instead of five years after his death.⁵⁶ In the Preface to *Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, Nietzsche writes: “All of the following chapters have been selected, not without caution, from my older writings—some go back all the way to 1877—perhaps clarified here and there, above all shortened. Read one after another, they will leave no doubt either about Richard Wagner or about myself: we are antipodes.”⁵⁷

The Epilogue to *Nietzsche Contra Wagner* is also rather revealing. In the first part, he details that his philosophy is the result of *amor fati*, his “inmost nature.”⁵⁸ It is this nature, Nietzsche lauds, that has taught him. He suggests that, although he has heralded Wagner as his teacher, he alone is responsible for his “*higher* health” and indeed his philosophy.⁵⁹ Wagner was his teacher only insofar as he brought with him sickness and pain. The second part of the Epilogue begins as a reflection on the first. For Nietzsche, Wagner is the abyss out of which he must emerge.⁶⁰ In the next part, Nietzsche attacks modernity and its reliance on reason. Here we find Wagner as modernity incarnate. In contrast, it concludes in praise of the Greeks. If Wagner is modernity, then the Greeks are the cure.⁶¹ *Nietzsche Contra Wagner* is as much a break with Wagner as it is a turn to the Greeks, a lesson not to be lost on Nietzsche’s audience.

**Zarathustra’s Frame**
As Nietzsche makes clear, all of his books are mere footnotes to *Zarathustra*. This is especially true of *The Gay Science*, for it was the book Nietzsche completed before beginning his magnum opus. It was reworked and republished following *Beyond Good and Evil*. Consequently, *The Gay Science* has the distinction of being the prelude and postlude to *Zarathustra*, and it serves as an indispensable frame to understanding Nietzsche’s most important, and most difficult, work.

The original publication of *The Gay Science* included an epigram on its title page, which Nietzsche had adopted from Emerson: “To the poet, the sage, all things are friendly and hallowed, all experiences profitable, all days holy, all men divine.”62 Nietzsche had elsewhere remarked of his fondness for Emerson, so this passage hardly seems out of place, particularly since it is quite Nietzschean.63 What is noteworthy, however, is that Emerson himself had used the term “joyful science” in his writings and lectures—a fact that Nietzsche never acknowledged. It is quite possible that Nietzsche did know of Emerson’s use of this phrase. “The Tomb Song” from *Zarathustra* contains a paragraph with reference to “gay wisdom” and another paraphrase of Emerson—“All days shall be holy to me.” It is not proof that Nietzsche took the “gay science” from Emerson, but it would be a great coincidence. If Nietzsche had lifted Emerson’s concept for his own book, it is fitting that Emerson should be placed at the outset. Perhaps more interesting is that the epigram is removed for the second publication of *The Gay Science* and replaced with something from Nietzsche, also in German:

I live in my own place,  
have never copied nobody even half,  
and at any master who lacks the grace to laugh at himself—I laugh.  
*Over the door to my house.*64
Lines 3 and 4 reiterate the theme of the book, but that can be said only incidentally of the first two. Regardless of whether Nietzsche borrowed “joyful science” from Emerson, he defiantly claims ownership of it on the title page when the book is revised. The last half of the new epigram may be philosophical, but the first half is territorial.

The original version of The Gay Science did not include a preface. In addition to the nod to Emerson, it included a “Prelude in German Rhymes,” which Nietzsche called “Joke, Cunning, and Revenge.” It is a collection of sixty-three poetic aphorisms. It is assuredly the only book with “science” in its title to begin like this. This is especially true because none of the verses seem to take science or knowledge as their theme. Whatever his intention, Nietzsche’s fröhliche Wissenschaft does not begin with science.

When The Gay Science was republished in 1887, Nietzsche added a new frame. The book, he admitted, “may need more than one preface.”65 “And in the end,” Nietzsche continues, “there would still remain room for doubt whether anyone who had never lived through similar experiences could be brought closer to the experience of the book by means of prefaces.”66 The language, and perhaps the theme, of The Gay Science is such that it will have to be lived if it is to be understood. In effect, the new preface serves as a guide to those not needing one.

The remainder of the first section of the new preface is remarkably open and direct. In Zarathustra Nietzsche writes of Zarathustra’s convalescence; in the Preface to The Gay Science, he writes of his own. “Gratitude pours forth continually, as if the unexpected had just happened—the gratitude of a convalescent—for convalescence was unexpected.”67 For Nietzsche, The Gay Science “signifies the saturnalia of a spirit who has patiently resisted a terrible, long pressure—patiently, severely, coldly, without submitting, but also without hope—and who is now all at once attacked by hope, the hope for health, and the intoxication of

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convalescence."\textsuperscript{68} Nietzsche not only tells that he convalesced, but also tells of his hope. Schacht is right to argue that all of the prefaces of 1886 have recovery as their common theme.\textsuperscript{69} Astonishingly, Nietzsche’s own convalescence is absent from \textit{Ecce Homo}. He reveals more of himself in this new preface than in his intellectual biography.

The second part of the new preface steps back from Nietzsche’s confession. Nietzsche mentions the “triumphant gratitude” of certain healthy philosophers—himself included, undoubtedly—and contrasts those who “\textit{need} their philosophy” as a sort of medication. Nevertheless, he does continue on the theme of convalescence, albeit it in a more impersonal and, indeed, negative manner. “We philosophers, if we should become sick, surrender for a while to sickness, body and soul—and, as it were, shut our eyes to ourselves.”\textsuperscript{70} Sick philosophers make for sick philosophies—a theme presented in \textit{Zarathustra}. Philosophy is not a cure for the sick but a “luxury” for the healthy. A “gay science” is predicated on a notion of health.

This is not to say that sickness does not have a place. Nietzsche admits that, for him, his chronic illness has been an invaluable perspective from which he has come to know what health truly is. “I am very conscious of the advantages that my fickle health gives me over all robust squares…. Only great pain is the ultimate liberator of the spirit.”\textsuperscript{71} It is this sense of health that reminds Nietzsche of the primacy of the body and the value of viewing life as a guide for science and the standard for judgments concerning truth.

The theme of health continues in the final section, and Nietzsche uses it as an opportunity to emphasise the main theme.\textsuperscript{72} Nietzsche is a changed man since \textit{Zarathustra}, and he has a changed philosophy. He is at once more innocent and dangerous, brazen and subtle. What he makes clear is that he, like his Zarathustra, has been redeemed. His is a philosophy that knows health, and he is unafraid to sing its praises, even to those on their deathbed.
It is only in the concluding part of the new preface that Nietzsche introduces the subject of the book. “No, this bad taste, this will to truth, to ‘truth at any price,’ this youthful madness in the love of truth, have lost their charm for us: for that we are too experienced, too serious, too merry, too burned, too profound,” he writes. “Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and ‘know’ everything.” Nietzsche ends the preface by offering the Greeks as an example of his teaching.

Nietzsche did more than tweak *The Gay Science* for its second publication; he returned to it in a substantive way, adding an entire chapter. It is certainly the longest of his revisions, dwarfing even the weighty “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism.” The original ending of *The Gay Science*, section 342 of Book IV, entitled “Incipit tragoedia,” parallels the beginning of *Zarathustra*. It is, with one minor change, the first section of what would become “Zarathustra’s Prologue.” Nietzsche clearly intended *The Gay Science* to frame *Zarathustra*.

His revision only emphasizes this fact. Added to it was Book V, entitled “We Fearless Ones.” The epigram for the addition is a quotation from Turenne, a great French general: “You tremble, carcass? You would tremble a lot more if you knew where I am taking you.” The epigram introduces the major theme of Book V: courage. Nietzsche returns to this theme often in the book, most notably in section 355. “Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know?” Nietzsche asks. His gay science demands, above all, fearless practitioners—that is, philosophers or “free spirits”—with courage enough to live in an uncertain world. To follow Nietzsche requires bravery of a military sort.

The first aphorism of Book V details Nietzsche’s “cheerfulness” at the fact that “the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable.” The “greatest recent event,” the reason that Zarathustra fled into solitude, is now a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest there has
ever been. It is a freedom from Christianity, freedom for creation, that gives “we philosophers and ‘free spirits’” the courage to venture out into the “open sea.”79 It seems fitting that Nietzsche returns to *The Gay Science* to celebrate this fact, given that the death of god was first announced in its pages.80 Nietzsche has come full circle, as it were, to rejoice in the death of god. The addition of the new book makes Nietzsche’s gay science even more joyous.

The penultimate aphorism of Book V mirrors the original end of *The Gay Science*. Entitled “The great health,” it ends with a nod to *Zarathustra*: “it is perhaps only with him that great seriousness really begins, that the real question mark is posed for the first time, that the destiny of the soul changes, the hand moves forward, the tragedy begins.”81 *The Gay Science* was intended to frame *Zarathustra* and was expanded with that in mind.

The Epilogue returns to the theme that opens the Preface: Nietzsche’s audience and their ability to comprehend his message. The “virtues of the right reader,” Nietzsche lectures, are “forgotten and unknown.”82 That is the curse of the artist, Nietzsche proposes. Nevertheless, that should not stop him from singing. Those who cannot sing a song of their own, or even understand the music of others, can at least sing along.

Apart from a new preface and Book V, Nietzsche also added an appendix of songs to *The Gay Science*. Of the new ending, he writes, “songs in which a poet makes fun of all poets in a way that may be hard to forgive.”83 The final song is set to dance. The original version of *The Gay Science* began in verse; Nietzsche now realizes that his gay science must end there.

Nietzsche structured *The Gay Science*, the original and the revision, expecting that careful readers will follow his own intellectual development. It is quite fitting that one of his last, and most powerful, books is an intellectual biography.
Ecce Homo

The prefaces of 1886-87 are not the final word that Nietzsche had on his books; they all reappear in Ecce Homo, where Nietzsche reviews, and indeed critiques, his previous books. He uses his biography as an opportunity to present his works anew, to fit them with new prefaces. For all of his talk of esotericism and preferring a selective audience, Nietzsche feared being misunderstood, and he used Ecce Homo to frame his entire corpus.

To reach the section where he examines his books, “Why I Write Such Good Books,” a reader must first go through sections with equally immodest titles, such as “Why I Am So Wise” and “Why I Am So Clever.” (No one could ever accuse him of being humble.) In a rare embrace of convention, Nietzsche presents his books in chronological order.

The first section finds him returning once again to his first book. “To be fair to The Birth of Tragedy,” writes Nietzsche, “one has to forget a few things.” He repeats its connection to Wagner, which he had detailed in “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism;” makes note again of how the book is “indifferent toward politics;” and remarks its “profound, hostile silence about Christianity.” He does, however, give the book credit for its “understanding of the Dionysian phenomenon among the Greeks” and its recognition of Socrates as “a typical decadent.” All in all, “this beginning is exceedingly strange,” Nietzsche admits, and the essay points away from it. In the concluding section, Nietzsche refers to his essay “Wagner in Bayreuth” and admits, “in all psychologically decisive places I alone am discussed—and one need not hesitate to put down my name or the word ‘Zarathustra’ where the text has the word ‘Wagner.’” Nietzsche wants his readers to know that his break with Wagner has had an impact on his books. The Birth of Tragedy is an accidental and crude preface to Zarathustra.
The reference to “Wagner in Bayreuth” foreshadows what comes next: Nietzsche’s treatment of *Untimely Meditations*, of which the Wagner essay was a part. The first section of this chapter merely summarises the arguments contained in the four “warlike” essays. In the middle section Nietzsche remarks that only the essay on David Strauss had any success.\(^90\) For Nietzsche, success meant strong sales and developing a reputation as an intellectual force. In sum, it gave Nietzsche the freedom to develop as a thinker.

In the concluding section, however, Nietzsche returns to the theme he initiated in the essay on *The Birth of Tragedy*: the new relationship he had with his teachers. “Now that I am looking back from a certain distance upon the conditions of which these essays bear witness, I do not wish to deny at bottom they speak only of me. The essay *Wagner in Bayreuth* is a vision of my future, while in *Schopenhauer as Educator* my innermost history, my *becoming*, is inscribed. Above all, my promise!”\(^91\) If the title of the latter essay is better said “Nietzsche as Educator,” Nietzsche was educating himself.

The real problem is not their subject; it is the treatment that the subjects receive. These essays are not the works of a philosopher, Nietzsche admits. “I had to be a scholar, too, for some time.”\(^92\) This echoes what he had said on the subject in an earlier text: “It may be necessary for the education of a genuine philosopher that he himself has also once stood on all these steps on which his servants, the scientific laborers of philosophy, remain standing.”\(^93\) It appears that these essays are “untimely” not because we are not ready to receive them, but because Nietzsche was not ready to write them. Not surprisingly, this book was his only one not to be fitted with a new preface and reissued. Consequently, when Nietzsche writes of these essays in *Ecce Homo*, it is not as a new preface or postlude, but an epitaph by Nietzsche the philosopher for Nietzsche the scholar.
Nietzsche’s earlier, quasi-academic works should be contrasted with his later books, particularly *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Nietzsche reveals here that *The Gay Science* was written in the time between his discovery of eternal recurrence and composing *Zarathustra*. Nietzsche then quotes at length from an aphorism entitled “The great health,” from Book V of *The Gay Science*, the chapter added after *Zarathustra* had been completed. Nietzsche presents *Zarathustra* as the pinnacle of human accomplishment: “This work stands altogether apart. Leaving aside the poets: perhaps nothing has ever been done from an equal excess of strength. My concept of the ‘Dionysian’ here became a *supreme deed*; measured against that, all the rest of human activity seems poor and relative.”

Nietzsche is unambiguous that the eternal recurrence is the teaching and the highest element of *Zarathustra*. What is more, this essay is one of the few places in Nietzsche’s writings where he draws a parallel between himself and the main character. “*Zarathustra* once defines, quite strictly, his task—it is mine, too—and there is no mistaking its meaning: he says Yes to the point of justifying, of redeeming even all of the past.”

Nietzsche uses *Zarathustra* as a mouthpiece for his own philosophy. From *Zarathustra* onward, all of Nietzsche’s writings were only “fish hooks.” As Lampert notes concisely, “*Zarathustra* begins where the later works end.”

Elsewhere Nietzsche is not so clear. For example, he ends the central essay in *On the Genealogy of Morals* by stopping short in describing this element of his teaching. *Beyond Good and Evil*, the book he wrote immediately after completing his masterpiece, contains a veiled allusion to the eternal recurrence, and *Zarathustra* appears only at the book’s conclusion, in the final stanza of “From High Mountains: Aftersong.”

*Ecce Homo* may not present all of Nietzsche the man, but it does present his philosophy in its entirety, or at least without hesitation. Nietzsche here reveals the things that are otherwise
absent from his other books. The doctrine of eternal recurrence, for example, is stated here more clearly than it is in *Zarathustra*: “The doctrine of the ‘eternal recurrence,’—that is, of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things.” It is with good reason that Stauth and Turner view *Ecce Homo* as a “last testament and the definite proclamation of the project of revaluation.” Similarly, Steinbuch writes: “all of [Nietzsche’s] writings occur as an outcome of his self-transformation. Because of this his autobiography [*Ecce Homo*] stands in a unique relationship to the rest of his writings, in that it identifies what were the beginning and end points of that self-transformation. *Ecce Homo* is central in Nietzsche’s corpus.” Nietzsche stops himself not because he doesn’t want to be understood, but because he wants the readers to experience his teaching. Philosophy is not a love of truth; it is a love of process, for truth is not a destination.

Nietzsche says as much in the Preface to *Ecce Homo*. Although the title—literally, “behold the man”—points to himself, the Preface ends with the first of many references to or lines from *Zarathustra*. It is from the final speech in Part One, where Zarathustra instructs his disciples to leave him. “One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil,” he says. We should expect Nietzsche’s biography to be a testament to himself, but instead, it is another signpost directing readers to his beloved *Zarathustra*. “I am one thing, my writings are another matter,” he writes. Nietzsche’s *ad hominem* approach to philosophy makes an author’s biography essential. *Ecce Homo* is about Nietzsche only incidentally; it is primarily about his books. *Ecce Homo* is not a retrospective or farewell: it is a roadmap to what had come before it. The fact that Nietzsche took the title of his autobiography from the famous words of Pontius Pilate says as much about his contempt for Christianity as it does about his sense of self-worth.
Conclusion: Nietzsche’s Esotericism

Nietzsche does not appear to be esoteric, at least in the way Strauss means. He does not have two distinct teachings: one for the few and one for the many. Instead, Nietzsche is fully alive to the fact that his “untimely” philosophy will not have a mass audience among all-too-modern men. His is a style, as the subtitle of *Zarathustra* indicates, “for all and none.”

Although he does not intentionally limit his audience, certainly not everyone is capable of comprehending his message. But there is a big difference between writing intentionally to exclude the masses and Nietzsche’s brand of esotericism, which results solely from the difficult and radical nature of his philosophy. As he writes:

> The difference between the exoteric and the esoteric, formerly known to philosophers—among the Indians as among the Greeks, Persians, and Muslims, in short wherever one believed in an order of rank and *not* in equality and equal rights—does not so much consist in this, that the exoteric approach comes from outside and sees, estimates, measures, and judges from the outside, not the inside: what is much more essential is that the exoteric approach sees things from below, the esoteric looks *down from above*.106

In sum, Nietzsche’s esotericism stems from the *perspective* that no-one else shares. His teaching may require aphorisms, songs, riddles, and other ambiguous styles, but Nietzsche uses just as many tools to assist his readers, clarifying his intent to whoever is able to understand him. He knew that, despite his best efforts, he will still be understood by only a few. His philosophy is a perspective that must be experienced to be appreciated. Nietzsche is a brilliant writer, but he was aware of his limitations; he can only take his readers so far.

Nietzsche’s use of prefaces, epilogues, and other addenda to frame his writings are all attempts to assist the reader. The preface is, for example, in many ways, the key aphorism. Yet the preface is not merely the first aphorism; it does more than bat lead-off. The preface introduces the reader to the main event, giving the reader a valuable perspective—the perspective Nietzsche wishes the reader to have in order to view properly the remainder of the work. It is
here that he makes clearest his intention to the reader. If Nietzsche uses his prefaces to give the reader a certain perspective, then he uses afterwords, epilogues, and postscripts in the same way. His style requires him to frame his philosophy to make his intent as clear as possible to the reader.\textsuperscript{107} In stark contrast to what Strauss says of esotericism, Nietzsche is rather transparent in his philosophising.

Why would a reader want to read \textit{The Birth of Tragedy} after reading “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism”? we might ask. What value is there in a work that has been abandoned by its author? According to Magnus, Stewart, and Mileur, Nietzsche “implicitly… indicates that, since the world already has \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, it does not need a revised version of \textit{The Birth of Tragedy}.”\textsuperscript{108} This view is not entirely accurate, for Nietzsche never completely abandoned his first book. Instead, he returned to it a number of times, the two most prominent being “An Attempt at a Self-Criticism” and the essay on it in \textit{Ecce Homo}. For Nietzsche, no work is ever devoid of value; even the New Testament and \textit{Parsifal} have a purpose.

Rather than constantly changing and editing his texts, however, Nietzsche reframed his works by adding prefaces, epilogues, and interpretations of them in his later books. He tended to his works like a garden—watering, pruning, and pulling up weeds. As he wrote in the preface added to \textit{Daybreak}, “This preface is late but not too late—what, after all, do five or six years matter? A book like this, a problem like this, is in no hurry.”\textsuperscript{109} Nietzsche considered his books important enough to keep returning to them. As Robert C. Solomon notes, “Nietzsche’s own writing is a lifelong and totally absorbing exercise in self-creation and self-validation.”\textsuperscript{110} By adding to them without changing a word, Nietzsche was able to develop a sort of text-overcoming, while preserving the path that he hoped others would follow. His books return eternally the same, however much their author might change. In this sense, his aim was never to
make them perfect, for that is an impossible and undesirable goal. Instead, Nietzsche reframed them to reflect the new perspective he had acquired by having gone past them.
Notes

2 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage, 1989), Preface §1; emphasis removed. Cf. Ibid., Books §1, where Nietzsche alludes to the fact that his time has not come yet—that is, that he is not ready to be understood.
10 Ibid., 139.
11 Ibid., 141.
12 Ibid., 147.
14 Lampert, 147.
15 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., Attempt §1.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., Attempt §2.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., Attempt §3.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., Attempt §4.
29 Ibid., Attempt §5.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., Attempt §7.
35 It is quite fitting that Walter Kaufmann paired *The Birth of Tragedy* with *The Case of Wagner* in his 1967 Random House translation.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., Postscript.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., Second Postscript.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., Epilogue.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
58 Ibid., Epilogue §1.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., Epilogue §2.
62 The actual quotation is: “To the poet, to the philosopher, to the saint, all things are friendly and sacred, all events profitable, all days holy, all men divine.” Nietzsche uses sage in the place of philosopher and saint. Ralph Waldo Emerson, “History” in *Emerson’s Prose and Poetry*, ed. Joel Porte and Saundra Morris (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2001), 109.
63 For an excellent treatment on this connection, see George J. Stack, *Nietzsche and Emerson: an elected affinity* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992). For an opposite view, see Kaufmann; he claims their differences are “far more striking” (*Gay Science*, 11n).
64 The original reads: Ich wohne in meinem eignen Haus, Hab Niemandem nie nichts nachgemacht / Und—lachte noch jeden Meister aus, Der nicht sich selber ausgelacht. / Ueber meinem Haustür.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 “I say ‘we’ for politeness’ sake,” Nietzsche wrote elsewhere; the same could be said of this passage. “Twilight of the Idols,” ‘Reason’ §5.
76 Ibid., §343.
77 Ibid.
80 Ibid., §125.
81 Ibid., §382.
82 Ibid., §383.
83 Ibid., Preface §1.
84 For example, Nietzsche, Gay Science, §381.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., §2.
89 Ibid., §4.
90 Ibid., ‘Untimely’ §2.
91 Ibid., §3.
92 Ibid.
93 Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §211.
95 Ibid., §8.
96 Ibid., ‘Good and Evil’ §1.
97 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 258.
99 Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §56.
100 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Birth’ §3; cf “Zarathustra” Vision and Riddle.
103 Kaufmann says Ecce Homo “contains all too many references to Zarathustra—most of them embarrassing.” “Editor’s Introduction,” Ecce Homo, 205.
104 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Preface §4.
105 Ibid., Books §1.
106 Nietzsche, Good and Evil, §30.
107 Attention to Nietzsche’s prefaces has recently extended to unpublished manuscripts. Friedrich Nietzsche, Prefaces to Unpublished Works, ed. Michael W. Gouke, Matthew K. Davis, and Lise Van Boe (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2005).
108 Bernd Magnus, Stanley Stewart, and Jean-Pierre Mileur, Nietzsche’s Case: Philosophy As/and Literature (Boca Raton, FL: Routledge, 1992), 90.