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Pro Memoria

113

Revolution in Canada

"A spiritual starveling
frantic for some True
Belief is a potential
revolutionary."

anon

"There can be no revolution
without terrorism and.....a
revolution is the greatest
misfortune of the generation
that carries it through."

Napoleon Bonaparte

Whether one agrees with these two conclusions of Bonaparte's, it is clear that the FLQ and many other revolutionaries in Canada would have no difficulty in accepting the first proposition while utterly rejecting the second. Indeed, no doubt there are many in Canada who abhor violence and terror as methods to achieve revolution but who support the need for revolution in Canada and elsewhere, and, who would consider the carrying out of a successful revolution as a great fortune for their generation and presumably for succeeding generations. However, whether a fundamental reconstruction of a society which is as sophisticated and as complex as that existing in Canada can be accomplished without force and violence is a moot point. Certainly, many of those who wish to replace "bourgeois institutions" in Canada with an "egalitarian society" are under no illusion that this can be accomplished without violence, and some, like the FLQ, even appear to believe it must be done through terror and by force, as if by such acts they can achieve spiritual cleanliness. If this is so, then a corollary must be that any successful defeat of such revolutionary aims probably is likely sooner or later to involve violent confrontation between revolutionaries and established authority of the kind now occurring in Quebec.

2. A problem for governments in Canada is to know how best to contain and to counter the revolutionary ferment across the land which seems quite likely to increase rather than to decrease, in part at least because of what has happened recently in Quebec. There is ample evidence that revolutionary movements across Canada, some of them at least as violent and as dangerous as the FLQ, have been inspired and excited by events in Quebec. Many of these movements, such as

have come out clearly in support of the FLQ and "freedom for the oppressed people of Quebec." Presumably, however, the solidarity with the FLQ which these groups are demonstrating is founded more on shared revolutionary attitudes and values than on any deep conviction that Quebec should be a separate state. Although no doubt for some, any development is welcome which hastens the overthrow of the "bourgeoisie"; and the separation of Quebec from Canada, might, in the eyes of many revolutionaries, hasten this process.

3. There can be no doubt that in dealing with revolution in Canada the government's first priority must be successfully to counter revolution in Quebec. The continuing situation in Quebec demands it and the posture taken by the various governments concerned makes any other approach impossible in political and in other terms. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the non-police measures which are available to governments to counter revolutionary activity in Quebec. It is clear, however, that the revolutionary appeal of the FLQ has been greatly enhanced for many persons in Quebec by the strong nationalist stand taken by the movement. Many French Canadians, who would not support the revolutionary ideas or the violent methods of the FLQ, nevertheless are ambivalent towards members of the movement since they share their aim to achieve a separate state. Thus, measures to improve the capabilities of the various police and security forces are unlikely in themselves to be sufficient and the full range of action open to governments in political, social, economic and other terms will have to be employed in different "mixes" if the separatist/terrorist activity in Quebec is to be successfully defeated. Presumably, political action in

these terms could run from such unlikely extremes as amnesty and exile for FLQ members to legislation permanently to outlaw the organization, its successors, and their adherents.

4. There are ways in which the various police and security forces in Quebec at the federal, provincial and municipal levels can be improved. However, I think it is worth emphasizing at this point that improvements in the capabilities in Quebec of the Federal Security Service are at once complicated by the situation facing the RCMP in a "non-contract" province. Even in a province which has a contract with the federal authorities, to provide police forces on a cost sharing basis, the Attorney-General of the province has jurisdiction over those forces insofar as the provisions of the Criminal Code are concerned. That is to say, the Attorney General, and not the Commissioner of the RCMP or any federal authority, decides how those forces are to be deployed and used. In a non-contract province, the distinction is even sharper since the Attorney General of the province has his own police forces. Moreover, the carrying out of activities in contract and in non-contract provinces associated with the preservation of national security is done with the tacit consent of the Attorney General of each province. The federal responsibility in this field appears to rest rather tenuously on certain sections of the RCMP Act and of the Official Secrets Act.

5. Thus, in Quebec, all matters embraced by the Criminal Code are the responsibility of the Attorney General of the Province and the police and legal authorities working under his direction. The various acts of terrorism committed by the FLQ; murder, kidnapping, robbery, bombings and so on, were breaches of the Criminal Code and the direct responsibility of the Justice Minister of the Province and the police forces under his control. As a consequence, all the operations conducted against the FLQ in the Province of Quebec are under the direction of the Justice Minister and the Director General of the Quebec Provincial Police. The RCMP, both on the criminal investigation side and in matters dealing with security and intelligence, plays a role in support of the provincial authorities and cannot itself carry out operations dealing

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with offences under the Criminal Code. If it were desired to have it otherwise, then amendments would be required to existing legislation.

6. If the jurisdictional and constitutional position is to remain unchanged, this places a premium upon the need for a smooth-working relationship between the provincial and federal authorities in Quebec and in Ottawa from the ministerial level on down. The same is true in Ontario. However, even the closest co-operation cannot get around the fact that the provincial authorities retain responsibility for taking action to deal with breaches of the Criminal Code and, therefore, for operations against the FLQ. Neither can the problems associated with the sharing, with provincial and municipal police forces, of information derived from RCMP sources, be easily put aside. Reasonably satisfactory methods have been worked out over several years for providing such information to police authorities in Quebec on a timely and continuing basis. However, very different standards of security within the various police forces concerned, possible infiltration of those forces by separatist/terrorist sympathizers and distinctions between the methods employed by police forces and a security service make an intimate relationship difficult. This does not have to do with such obvious questions as identification of sources since no security or intelligence service worthy of the name can afford to reveal its sources. In any event, there have been no insurmountable problems in providing information to the Quebec authorities derived from human and other sources without compromising those sources.

8. Any analysis of the violent revolution in Quebec clearly must begin with as much knowledge as possible about those making up its hard core and who have those qualities of fanaticism, ruthlessness and destructive purpose which make them so dangerous. Any such analysis in depth probably requires, among other things, the combined talents of experienced psychiatrists, sociologists, psychologists and criminologists. Insofar as the FLQ is concerned, studies are a step in this direction. However, at least as important as any study of the anatomy of the hard-core activists among the revolutionaries, is an intimate knowledge of the "theorists" and the "planners" of these movements and of their doctrines. For example, the extraordinary document entitled "Revolutionary Strategy and the Role of the Avant Garde" to which Mr. Saulnier and Mr. Michel Côté drew public attention when they testified in November 1969 before a parliamentary committee inquiring into the Company of Young Canadians, is very revealing on this score. To know the authorship of the document and the part it has played in violent revolution in Quebec would help in fashioning effective means to counter such activities. No doubt, analysis of the tens of thousands of documents recently seized under the provisions of the War Measures Act will assist this process, but it is unlikely to be completed quickly or easily.

9. Presumably, however, any studies of Quebec revolutionaries as such must be done against the wider background of revolutionary thought and activity elsewhere

in Canada and abroad. For example, the changes wrought since 1945 in the international order of things have altered sharply the relationship of the individual to society, to government and to the international order itself. This is obvious to the revolutionary and to the student protester but, despite their rejection of liberal democracy, they have yet to produce an ethic of social and political action half as good. This, it seems to me, is a weakness of most revolutionary theory in Canada which should be vigorously exploited. An "egalitarian society based upon new values to be discovered" is hardly likely to attract a majority of Canadians, even in Quebec where such an appeal is closely linked with the nationalist aspirations of many French Canadians.

10. Perhaps some of the clearest descriptions of how revolutionaries in Canada regard their role is contained in a book entitled "The New Left in Canada", published in 1970, and edited by Demetrius I. Roussopoulos,

The following excerpts from that book deserve close attention:

"Radical student actions in Canada are therefore a part of an international rebellion against similar conditions in other industrial/technological societies. The most important process going on in our society today is the sweeping de-institutionalization of the bourgeois social structure. A basic, far reaching disrespect and a profound disloyalty is developing towards the values, the forms, the aspirations, and above all, the institutions of the established order. On a scale unprecedented in new left's short history, thousands of youth are shedding their commitment to the society in which they live. They no longer believe in its claims. They no longer respect its symbols. They no longer accept its goals, and, most significantly, they refuse almost intuitively to live by its institutional constraints and social codes."

"This growing refusal runs very deep. It extends from an opposition to war into a hatred of political manipulation in all its forms. Starting from a rejection of Canada's colonized non-country status, it brings into question the very existence of hierarchical power as such.

In its detestation of middle-class values and life-styles, it rapidly evolves into a rejection of the commodity system; from an irritation with environmental pollution and pillage by capitalism, it passes into a rejection of the Canadian city and modern urbanism. In short it tends to transcend every particularistic critique of society and evolves into a generalized opposition to the bourgeois order on an ever-broadening scale."

"....The society, in effect, becomes disorderly, undisciplined, Dionysian - a condition that reveals itself most dramatically in an increasing rate of official crimes amongst young people, who constitute the vast majority of official offenders in this country."

"....In its concrete details, this disintegrating social process is nourished by many sources. It develops with all the unevenness, indeed all the contradictions, that mark every revolutionary trend. These sources include personal habits in dress, social relationships, notions of freedom and so on. Even their spokesmen are often at odds. But in retrospect, we can see that one not only transcends but also presupposes the other in a cumulative development towards change."

"....One difference between its development in Canada as contrasted with other countries is that it is less aware of itself as a total tendency in this country."

"....In Montreal, Toronto, Windsor, Regina, Vancouver and elsewhere, the typical institutionalized forms of public dissatisfaction of our own day - orderly elections, demonstrations, mass meetings - tend to give way to direct action by crowds. This shift from predictable, highly organized protests within the institutionalized framework of the existing society to sporadic, spontaneous, near-insurrectionary assaults from outside (and even against) socially acceptable forms reflects a profound change in the popular psychology of youth."

"....Ultimately, it is in the streets that power must be dissolved - for the streets, where daily life is endured, suffered, and debased, where power is confronted and fought, must be turned into the domain where daily life is enjoyed, created and nourished."

"....Finally, in Canada it is important to talk about a revolutionary youth movement in the process of setting up a radical student movement. The fact of the matter is that fewer high school students get to our universities than in the United States. These students consequently enter the labour force. Therefore stress must be put on the crucial importance of mobilizing high school students. This for two reasons: not only will this obviously influence the make-up of the young workers, but also will ensure insurgency on the campuses tomorrow."

11. These ideas, although better articulated than most revolutionary doctrine in Canada, express thoughts which inspire most revolutionary activity in Canada today, including that of the FLQ. Such ideas provide little comfort for those in Canada who may believe the status quo can be maintained and that revolutionary activities are likely easily to be defeated or even contained. Indeed, if the theories about human evolution contained in a recent book by Robert Bigelow, a Canadian zoologist, are accepted, recent events in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada take on a very sombre aspect. Bigelow contends that war is not an affliction of civilization but as old as our apelike ancestors and a basic factor in human evolution. He argues that in modern society a functional social group is one, "within which the word murder has meaning. We do not hang our soldiers for killing our enemies in battle. The Commandment 'Thou shalt not kill' did not apply to the Canaanites." Thus, if nationalists in Quebec - Marxist-Leninists in British Columbia or Weathermen in the United States or extremists anywhere - are willing to kill their countrymen for an idea or an ideal, they are in their self-evaluation either murderers or warriors. It is possible knowingly to commit murder for a cause, but a movement can, by its actions, become alienated from the larger group, ostracized and a legitimate target for violence. A murder is a violation of the group code. Terrorism

indicates a breakdown in the social structure itself. Bigelow suggests, "Perhaps we have over extended ourselves. Perhaps our social cohesion will disintegrate from within; even if we refrain from a total thermonuclear war. Other empires have disintegrated into dark ages of savage violence, and our own civilization is now about as old as those were then when they collapsed."

12. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) Revolutionary activity across the country will continue to grow. Indeed, recent events in Quebec probably have inspired and intensified revolutionary activity elsewhere in Canada where the threat of violence and anarchy is at least as great as it is in Quebec.
- (b) Even if the FLQ, its successor and similar organizations remain permanently outlawed (which seems unlikely in political terms), revolutionary activity in Quebec, based in part on the establishment of a separate state, will continue. Even if all those among the FLQ responsible for the most recent acts of violence and "apprehended insurrection" are caught and successfully punished, there are bound to be others in the junior colleges, universities and in the labour force who will take up the torch.
- (c) Revolutionaries in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada will seek to modify their strategy and their tactics in the light of whatever lessons they may draw from recent events. While further kidnappings, robberies and indiscriminate bombings may be attempted, it seems more likely that assassination, hijackings, and planned sabotage will be resorted to since these seem more likely to achieve the aims they desire and in some ways are less risky.
- (d) The methods of the police and the Security Service and the machinery of government at the federal-provincial and municipal level across the country for dealing effectively with existing and anticipated revolutionary threats needs to be reviewed and improved. However, it probably is fair to say that even increased capabilities in the field of security and intelligence activity at different

Levels of government are unlikely to produce better or earlier warning of unplanned, random acts of terrorism of the kind apparently involved in the abduction and murder of Pierre Laporte, although hopefully, they would materially assist and speed up subsequent criminal investigations.

(e) Existing immigration legislation and regulations (and the spirit in which they are implemented), need to be looked at in the light of whatever measures are decided upon to cope with revolutionary activities in the country.

(f) We probably would be wise to expect that different governments who believe it may be in their interests to weaken Canada will take advantage of existing revolutionary activity in Quebec and elsewhere in the country to further their own ends.

13. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) On the assumption that no fundamental changes are contemplated in the present apportionment between federal, provincial and municipal authorities of responsibility for maintaining law and order, a review of existing arrangements for sharing those responsibilities should be begun immediately. Such a review could take the form of bilateral negotiations, and, at the appropriate time, joint discussion. Presumably, in the initial stages at least, such discussions could take place at the official level between law officers of the Crown, and the police, military and security authorities concerned. Such discussions could extend to ways in which municipal and provincial authorities can be helped to improve their capabilities to keep abreast of revolutionary activities, in co-operation with the Security Service.

(b) Whatever improvements it may be possible to make in

the presentation, style, timeliness and quality of reports prepared by the Security Service, the evaluation and appreciation of the intelligence they contain and the collation of such reports with other relevant material, should be done by a body separate from the Security Service. Otherwise, there is the classic danger that such evaluations may tend to justify particular pieces of intelligence. No doubt, the Security Service would be represented on such a body and, in certain cases, might be expected to make a major contribution to its work. It is not intended in these recommendations to suggest the composition of this body, its terms of reference or where it should be placed within the government structure.

- (c) Whatever the standard of excellence of the numerous reports prepared by the Security Service in the last two years dealing with revolutionary activity in Canada, their usefulness has been blunted by the lack of adequate machinery for their handling within the higher reaches of government. There has been no government machinery able to provide a continuing overview of the many facets of the development of revolutionary activity. This has meant that the phenomenon often has been viewed in its different parts rather than in its totality and solutions to the various problems, when they have been sought, have been piecemeal and uncoordinated. For example, the JIC/IPC and the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence has considered periodic reports on the threat. The Security Panel, in its continuing examination of the recommendations contained in the Report of the Royal Commission on Security, has considered various aspects of the problem. The interdepartmental Committee on Law and Order has considered certain other aspects of the matter. The interdepartmental committee dealing with citizenship problems has from time to time considered more specific aspects of revolutionary activity. The interdepartmental committee dealing with immigration matters has dealt with various aspects of revolutionary movements in Canada. Particular aspects of revolutionary activity, for example, those involving the Company of Young

Canadians and the Communist Party of Canada - Marxist-Leninist have been the subject of individual reports to specific Ministers. Since the abduction of Mr. Cross, two ad hoc groups, one in the Department of External Affairs, the other in the Prime Minister's office, have been added to these other bodies. The net effect has been, and is, a thorough diffusion of thought and effort on the subject.

There should be one body, presumably reporting to the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, responsible for providing Ministers with an overview of revolutionary activity, and indeed, any activities involving subversion, espionage or sabotage which seem to be inimical to Canada's interests. Clearly, there is a relationship between this recommendation and the immediately preceding one, but whatever organizational arrangements may be decided upon to provide clearer lines of responsibility and channels of communication, presumably these need not negate the principle that an intelligence-gathering agency should not be responsible alone for evaluating its products. It is not the purpose of this memorandum to suggest the best organizational structure to achieve the objective. This already has been done in the Report of the Royal Commission on Security, in various counter-proposals to the recommendations of the Commission on the subject, and presumably also will be dealt with by Mr. Claude Isbister in his report. The need for reform is urgent and even an imperfect organizational structure, which could be modified as experience dictates, would be better than a continuation of the unsatisfactory state of uncertainty and confusion which has existed since the Report of the Royal Commission on Security was submitted in September 1968.

- (d) On the assumption that it is only a question of time until assassinations, airline hijackings and sabotage become a more important part of the repertoire of revolutionaries in Canada, arrangements to cope with these threats should be reviewed, and particularly those affecting sabotage.

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Certainly the large amounts of explosives apparently in the hands of revolutionaries give them the means to carry out acts of sabotage on a large scale. There already exist various plans for guarding against assassinations and airplane hijackings. Nevertheless, these probably could be reviewed with profit, and especially if this were to be done in conjunction with provincial and municipal authorities. There appear to be no similar plans, at least on a national level, to cope with sporadic and coordinated efforts to carry out sabotage. In a country as large as Canada, the task is formidable, but, if approached very selectively on a municipal and regional basis, not unmanageable.

John Starnes
Director General
Security and Intelligence

OTTAWA
12-11-70
JS:ht

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S E C R E T

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The FLQ and QUEBEC

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1. This memorandum attempts to place the events of the past fortnight within a conceptual framework and to suggest different ways of viewing the problems posed by the activities of the FLQ, together with possible courses of action for dealing with some of them. Clearly, a number of the measures discussed in this memorandum, embracing as they do broad issues of public policy, lie well outside of the purview of law enforcement agencies as such and call for a sophisticated blend of the use of the executive and the administrative powers of government at different levels. It should be added perhaps that this memorandum has been written without benefit of the material on government dossiers and no doubt suffers thereby.

2. There seems to be no exact parallel between the situation in Quebec and the activities of the Front de Libération du Quebec (FLQ) and similar situations which have arisen elsewhere in recent years. Indeed, in many ways the situation we are faced with in Quebec appears to be unique. For example, the French experience in Algeria seems to offer us little help except perhaps insofar as the development by the French of short term techniques and tactics for dealing with terrorist activities which are not perhaps applicable in Canada. The situation facing the French in Algeria in the late 1950's was quite different from the situation facing the Canadian and Quebec governments in 1970. The Algerian liberation movement was quite unlike the FLQ and the economic, political and sociological aspects of the situation in Algeria in the 1950's were quite different than those existing in Quebec in 1970. Moreover, the position of the French armed forces in Algeria has nothing in common with the use of the Canadian Armed Forces in Quebec. Among other things, it will be recalled that in May 1958 the French Army in Algeria was on the verge of drastic action which clearly would have led to a military coup d'etat in France itself if deGaulle had not assumed power.

3. The FLQ had its beginnings in about 1962 as a clandestine revolutionary movement organized on the

basis of more or less autonomous cells which act or appear to act independently. A separate French-speaking state in Quebec has remained a central theme of FLQ policy. Latterly, however, the essentially ultra-nationalistic aims of the FLQ appear to have undergone subtle and important modifications, perhaps reflecting the changing and diverse nature of its membership and the revolutionary inspiration which the movement has derived from elsewhere. The FLQ Manifesto read over Radio Canada on 15 October is a curious and a clever mixture of Marx, Che Guevara and Maoist slogans with heavy emphasis on the shortcomings and injustices of the capitalist system.

4. While it seems unlikely that the broad mass of people in Quebec will find much to attract them in the language of the FLQ manifesto, the fact remains that the movement has been able to remain alive and even to flourish because some part of the population of Quebec, either consciously or unconsciously, has supported at least some of the activities and apparent aims of the FLQ. No doubt there will be many among these erstwhile supporters who now will be repelled by the recent violent and savage acts of the FLQ. By the same token, alas, there will be some who now know they can condone violence and will not shrink from savage acts in future. However, it seems clear that among younger Quebecers, including those in the universities and the junior colleges there is still support for the FLQ. To my mind, this support represents at least as serious a threat to stability in Quebec as the FLQ itself. Indeed, if there are parallels which can be drawn, perhaps recent events in Quebec can be more nearly equated with events in France in the Spring of 1968. Some of the grievances expressed in the manifesto nevertheless appear to have some basis in fact and their resolution is a prerequisite to any attempts to wither the basis of support which the FLQ continues to receive in Quebec. Thus, dealing with the causes of disaffection among some elements of Quebec's youth, including the students, and the vigorous and immediate adoption of a wide range of social policies in Quebec probably are among the most practical ways of dealing with the long-term effects of the FLQ phenomenon. To this end the full range of the information media available to various levels of government should be used. At the Federal level full use should be made of Information Canada, the CBC and other information media to deal with the root causes of unrest among Quebec's youth, many of whom are confused, alienated and rootless. It should be said here that this condition is not

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peculiar to the youth of Quebec. It is a phenomenon found throughout Canada and in many other parts of the world. What makes the attitude of youth in Quebec important and urgent is the evident attraction for many of them of the FLQ's activities and its philosophy which they have equated to their own disaffection.

5. For the short term it seems clear, given the constitutional and jurisdictional situation in Quebec, that a quickening and a widening of co-operation between Federal, Provincial and Municipal authorities at all levels is most important if the immediate threat posed by the FLQ is to be effectively contained and if longer term national interests are to be best served. Co-operation has not always been effective or close, hampered as it has been at times by professional jealousies, jurisdictional differences, inadequate dialogue and lack of mutual trust, i.e. the lack of confidence in the Montreal City Police brought about by their strike action last year. The alternative, of course, is to attempt to concentrate control of anti-FLQ measures entirely in Federal hands. I believe this would be unwise on political grounds and quite impractical in other terms. If this latter view is accepted then perhaps the most effective immediate measure to be taken would be the invocation at the highest level in all these governments, Federal, Provincial, and Municipal, of the need for closer co-operation and coordination and to request a review of existing machinery to ensure that this goal is being as effectively met as possible. At the same time perhaps and independent of whatever action may be taken to achieve an improved tri-partite co-operation, Federal capabilities in Quebec to cope with the FLQ and similar threats to national unity should be built up. The mere accretion of strength, however, will not of itself provide an answer since the personnel required must be bilingual, and adequately trained, and the acquisition of new human and other sources, which might be expected to result from an increase in the Federal government's law enforcement arm in Quebec, will require time. Since the eventual break-up of the FLQ is not likely to be accomplished quickly or easily, the reallocation of existing resources and perhaps the provision of new resources to this end seems justified and necessary if the Federal government wishes to improve its independent sources of information about separatist/terrorist activities in Quebec.

6. The next immediate step in the police investigations will involve the interrogation of all those arrested - a formidable and time-consuming task - and the evaluation and

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compilation of all the information thus gleaned. This may lead to further arrests and to re-interrogations, a process in its totality which could take several weeks. During this stage, no doubt, a number of those arrested whose activities in the FLQ were peripheral may have to be released since insufficient evidence may exist upon which to lay charges against them. It is possible that some of these investigations may lead to the apprehension of those responsible for the kidnappings and for Mr. Laporte's murder. It is equally possible, however, that it will not and that many months of painstaking and detailed police work will have to take place before any leads are uncovered to the kidnapers and to those making up the hard core of the FLQ. This is a most difficult period for those taking decisions at all levels of government and for the different police authorities involved, and especially since responsibility for policy decisions and for operations must be shared between the Federal, Provincial and Municipal authorities. What seems essential is that no loss of confidence on either side, and between the executive and operational arms of government at different levels, be permitted to develop since it can only be to the advantage of the FLQ and to the detriment of the long-term interests of the country. More immediately, the arrests and the seizure of material should lead to a better understanding of the FLQ, its methods and more important the anatomy of its members. (Perhaps the recent findings of _____ in Montreal may be relevant.) Hopefully, many of those arrested can be successfully charged under the Public Order Regulations 1970 and thus removed from circulation.

7. Clearly, in the coming weeks it will be to the advantage of all the authorities concerned to keep the FLQ constantly off balance and all means to this end should be considered. Among such means is arrest and the threat of arrest, interception of FLQ communications, infiltration of FLQ cells by various means and the development of a sophisticated program of "disinformation".

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10. The truth is, of course, that the advantage, and particularly in a democratic society, appears to be with organizations like the FLQ at least in the short term. The following excerpt from Edward Luttwak's "Coup d'Etat" seems to explain in succinct terms why this may be so:

"Why have regimes in the twentieth century proved so fragile? It is, after all, paradoxical that this fragility has increased while the established procedures for security changes in government have on the whole become more flexible. The political scientist will reply that though the procedures have become more flexible, pressures for change have also become stronger, and that the rate of increase in flexibility has not kept up with the growth of social and economic pressures. Perhaps the ultimate source of destabilizing pressures has been the spectacular progress of scientific discovery and the resultant technological change."

11. There are more potential hostages and targets than there are policemen and soldiers to guard them day and night. Thus, long term solutions to the various problems do not lie only in measures aimed at achieving physical security. For

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the short term and until the immediate threat can be contained there seems no doubt that extraordinary physical security precautions are necessary and effective. The trick, of course, is to judge for exactly how long these precautions should be continued and when they can safely be progressively withdrawn.

It would seem important to sever these links, and, where possible, to prevent the establishment of new ones. The most obvious way to do this is to restrict the admission to Canada of persons who, by their record of activities elsewhere, are likely to support the FLQ, and the withdrawal of passport facilities for Canadians who are known or suspected FLQ supporters and couriers. Clearly, this will require an immediate tightening up of existing immigration regulations and a far more exacting application of them. No doubt, the existence of the Public Order Regulations 1970 may assist this process.

13. Although a somewhat banal note on which to end such a memorandum, it occurs to me to suggest a further punitive measure against the FLQ which clearly could not be introduced while Mr. Cross' fate remains uncertain. I suggest consideration be given to enacting the necessary legislation to revoke the citizenship of all those already convicted of criminal offenses on behalf of the FLQ and a declaration of intent by the government to take similar action against those convicted of such offenses in future. I have in mind also the deterrent effect which such a declaration of intent might have

Apart from the symbolic value of withdrawing from those concerned the attributes of Canadian citizenship, an action which probably would strike a chord among a majority of Canadians, revoking of citizenship presumably would mean that such persons no longer could travel on a Canadian passport or enjoy the advantages abroad of being a Canadian. They would indeed be outlawed which seems a fitting punishment among others for those who seek to destroy Canada.

John Starnes
Director General
Security and Intelligence

MEMORANDUM

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DIRECTOR GENERAL,
SECURITY SERVICE
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE

JOHN SPARNES

YOUR FILE No.
Votre dossier

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OUR FILE No.
Notre dossier

DATE July 20, 1971

FROM
De

HEAD, SECURITY PLANNING AND RESEARCH GROUP
DEPARTMENT OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

SUBJECT
Sujet

Monthly Reports to Solicitor General

With reference to Para. 12(b) of my memorandum to you of June 30, 1971 in which I mentioned that the Solicitor General wanted you to prepare a report for him each month on eavesdropping devices used, I had a further discussion with the Solicitor General last evening in the light of our discussion on this subject.

The Minister made it clear that he did not want to be acquainted with the operational side of these activities, such as how various devices are installed nor does he intend to remove from you the authority to install devices when in your judgement they are necessary. What he does want is a monthly report which will give him the following information for each occasion when an eavesdropping device was used:

- (a) Where the device was installed, i.e. apartment, house, etc.
- (b) The individual(s) the device was directed against.
- (c) Why the device was used.
- (d) For how long the device was installed.
- (e) What type of information was received through the device during the month (if any).

As I understand it, the principle reason the Minister wants this information is to enable him to monitor the activities of the Security Service to determine the proportion of activities directed against subversives, revolutionaries and espionage respectively.


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The Minister wants the first report to cover the eavesdropping activities for July and to be given to him at the end of July.

Though you may wish to discuss this requirement further with the Minister, may I suggest that a report for July be prepared along the lines I have described which you could then discuss with the Minister when it is delivered.


Robin Bourne
for E. A. Côté,
Deputy Solicitor General

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TOP SECRET

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FILE
NOT USED.

July 26, 1971

✓
26 JULY 71

MEMORANDUM TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

Attached is a report of audio surveillance operations carried out by the Security Service for July 1971, which henceforth will be rendered to you each month at the time we report to you on telephone interception operations. Unlike the Certificates of Review for telephonic and telegraphic interceptions, which are made under authority of the relevant sections of the Official Secrets Act, we are not suggesting that you authorize the continuance of such ~~non-legal~~ operations thereby avoiding some of the political and other difficulties which could arise from having a Minister of the Crown directly involved in operations which are or may be outside the law.

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John Starnes
Director General
Security Service

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

27 July 1971

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
TO: The DSI & A/DSI

1. I return various papers having to do with suggestions that we should render periodic reports to the Minister on audio surveillance installations; in particular, a memorandum dated July 20th from Mr. Bourne to me, a draft memorandum dated July 26th from me to the Solicitor General, which was not used, and a memorandum prepared for my use on some of the persons against whom we are carrying out, or have carried out, audio surveillance attacks.

2. At the suggestion of the Commissioner, the only paper I gave to the Minister last night, when we saw him, was a list of audio surveillance installations, divided into Part A (PERMANENT) and Part B (TEMPORARY). As you will note, the Minister has signified that he saw this document and dated it. He did not ask that it be rendered to him on a monthly basis and he did not make any suggestions for amendment to the format. I propose, therefore, that from time to time we render to him a similar report, but only when there are significant changes. I would expect that for the most part, these would usually only occur in the temporary installations. However, to enable me to make a judgment on this matter, I would be grateful if I could have such a report rendered to me on a monthly basis.

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John Starnes
Director General
Security Service

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