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Privy Council Office

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TOP SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

January 5, 1970

A meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence was held on Friday, December 19, 1969, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 340-S.

PRESENT:

- The Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) in the Chair
- The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp)
- The Solicitor General (Mr. McIlraith)
- The President of the Treasury Board (Mr. Drury)
- The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux)
- The Minister of Justice (Mr. Turner)
- The Secretary of State (Mr. Pelletier)

*Copies #11, (4) and (14) returned E. Stoyak 1-26-72*

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ALSO PRESENT:

- The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. R.G. Robertson)
- Mr. M. Cadieux (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs)
- Mr. J.K. Starnes (Assistant Under-Secretary of State)
- Mr. E.A. Côté (Deputy Solicitor General)
- Mr. E.B. Armstrong (Deputy Minister of National Defence)
- Major General M.R. Dare (Department of National Defence)
- Mr. D.S. Maxwell (Deputy Minister of Justice)
- Mr. D.H. Christie (Assistant Deputy Attorney General)
- Mr. J. Leger (Under-Secretary of State)
- Commissioner W.L. Higgitt
- Assistant Commissioner J.E.M. Barrette (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
- Mr. M. Lalonde (Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister)
- Mr. D.F. Wall (Secretary) (Privy Council Office)

TOP SECRET



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CURRENT THREATS TO NATIONAL ORDER AND UNITY

QUEBEC SEPARATISM

The Cabinet Committee had for consideration a Memorandum of the Prime Minister entitled "Current Threats to National Order and Unity - Quebec Separatism" (S&I-10, December 17, 1969). The Document had been circulated earlier to the Ministers of the Committee, and copies were handed to officials at the beginning of the meeting.

The Prime Minister, in introducing the Document, said that the Cabinet had recently agreed that the problem of national unity be regarded as a priority problem to be dealt with on a multi-departmental basis, and had further agreed that it be considered together with the related priority problem of law and order. In light of the current situation in Quebec, the Memorandum before the Committee had been drafted in such a way as to take into account the two priority problems, with particular emphasis on the problem of Separatism in Quebec. It was desirable that great priority be allocated to this aspect of the problem, bearing in mind that no modern state would allow a threat of this magnitude to its unity and integrity without mounting a consistent and coordinated defence against it.

The Prime Minister then summarized the various sections of the Memorandum including the conclusions and recommendations. He stressed the urgency of the problem and the need to cooperate with the other governments concerned, preserving the right of the Federal Government to establish and maintain its own policies. It would be necessary to establish a clear policy on Separatism and to provide clear directives to the departments and agencies primarily concerned with Separatism. The danger of back-lash inherent in these policies and the procedures flowing from them would need to be carefully assessed. The need for coordinated information and action was paramount, and sources of information other than the R.C.M. Police would have to be developed. Contingency plans and long-term counter-action would have to be considered by the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning and in due course by the Cabinet in the general context of national unity. There appeared to be a requirement for an overall planning unit in order that Ministers would have an effective tool to sift information and to coordinate all policies towards Quebec.

The Minister of Justice said that the Memorandum reflected two separate but related problems in dealing with the Separatist phenomenon, the problem of law and order and the political problem: The first related primarily to activity by terrorists, some of whom may be using the Separatist movement for their own ends--e.g., the establishment of a "Cuban type" regime in Quebec. The problem posed by the Parti Québécois was not necessarily related to the problem of law and order but rather to the problem of national unity. It may therefore be necessary to deal with the two problems in different ways in order to avoid conflicts and the danger of being accused of using law and order as an anti-Separatist tool.



Mr. Turner pointed out that the federal role in law and order was fairly limited except in wartime, and was in fact tertiary in relation to political power and the use of force. Under the Criminal Code of Canada the primary responsibility for law and order lay with the Provincial Attorneys General except in cases of conspiracy. While the Federal Attorney General could institute proceedings in these cases it had only happened once in Canadian history. Action in the recent sedition cases in Quebec had been taken by the Quebec authorities. However, the nature of the problem was such that it was desirable that the Federal Government examine its role in peacetime and consider whether it should be expanded in order to give the Federal Attorney General more power to initiate action in offenses of this kind. His department was therefore considering the establishment of a Federal Jurisdiction Act.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs agreed that Separatism could be regarded as a political problem and also a problem of subversive activity.

It would be necessary to pay more attention to all of these aspects, but great care would have to be taken if it were decided to gather information.

15(i)

15(i)

Involvement in counter-espionage against Canadian citizens who were not acting illegally would pose serious risks to the federal position and could greatly increase Separatist strength. The Government could be accused of persecuting a legitimate political movement.

15(i)

The Secretary of State said there were two categories of phenomena dealt with in the Memorandum, the first being the unrest and malaise arising from the politicization of youth, and the second the phenomenon of Quebec Separatism. While these posed a dangerous combination, it was important to recognize that even without Separatism the problem of alienation would continue to exist in all parts of the country. It was Mr. Pelletier's view that where police action was clearly required it would be welcomed by the mass of the population of Quebec, including the Parti Québécois, who were playing a respectable role and attempting to eliminate violent persons from that Party. He would particularly like to know more of what resources the R.C.M.P. had in the Province of Quebec in terms of people trained to deal with the problems of Separatism. It was his own fear that the R.C.M.P. in Quebec were not closely identified with the milieu, and he felt that unless the federal contribution in this regard could be greatly improved it would be preferable to leave the problem to the local authorities.



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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

The Solicitor General said he welcomed the Memorandum and the opportunity to discuss this important subject. He was concerned at the suggestion that the intelligence resources of the Armed Forces might be increased to deal with Separatism, in that there might be a conflict in having the Forces deal with essentially civilian problems. He noted that the term "Separatism" tended to be used loosely to cover the activities of those who desired a separate state through political conviction and those others who were using Separatism to achieve a state of chaos.

IS(1)

Concerning Mr. Pelletier's comments, Mr. McIlraith said he found them disturbing, and pointed out that the R.C.M. Police provided a great deal more intelligence on the problem than did the other Police Forces concerned. Cooperation among the various Forces was good, but needed to be improved. As to information, it was Mr. McIlraith's view that there was already far more available than was being put to effective use, and he cited as an example information which had been provided to the Privy Council Office on a continuing basis concerning activities of certain members of

IS(1)

The Minister of National Defence said he disagreed with the Solicitor General on the question of using the Armed Forces to gather information about Separatism in Quebec. He felt that this activity could be usefully expanded and directed more specifically to this problem. As to the use of information, he noted that whatever was available had been so severely limited in circulation that Ministers were not fully aware of its implications. A review was being made of procedures for aid to civil power, and it was tentatively concluded that the greatest failure lay in a lack of knowledge of the procedures by the municipal officials concerned, particularly in relation to the recent strike of the Montreal City Police.

The Prime Minister said it was necessary to distinguish between the law and order problem, which included aid to the civil power, and the general problem of national unity and the question of Separatism in particular. A great deal of information concerning the first problem would be required in order to deal effectively with the second. It was for consideration whether the Cabinet should establish a separate bureau to deal with information on both problems.

The Prime Minister said it would be important to determine what attitude should be adopted toward the problem of Separatism as a whole. In the past, Communism had been considered such a menace to democratic structures that the police had been empowered to gather information on Communist activities in Canada. This being the case, and the Federal Government being dedicated to the maintenance of Canada as a nation, it was for consideration whether the same techniques should be applied to all Separatists.

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Mr. Sharp agreed that this posed a special problem in that some Separatists would not consider it disloyal to be so while others might be prepared to use Separatism for their own undemocratic purposes. He thought Canadians generally would not be disturbed if they knew the Government were working against revolutionaries, but it would be a very different matter to use the same techniques in order to determine the nature of legal Separatist activities.

Mr. Pelletier said it was important not to lose sight of the fundamental distinction involved. Until belief in Separatism had been made a criminal activity, it would not be legitimate to have the police follow Separatists in order to preserve law and order.

Mr. Turner agreed and noted that there was a basic difference between a legitimate Separatist and a person committed to the violent overthrow of existing government. As to the need to coordinate information, he would be concerned if such coordination did not distinguish between information relating to Separatism and that relating to real subversion. There was nothing in the criminal law to prevent "peaceful subversion".

The Prime Minister said it would be necessary to fight Separatists, but perhaps not in the same way as revolutionaries would have to be fought.

The Secretary to the Cabinet suggested that consideration be given the degree to which there should be a parallel between Communism and Separatism. He noted that, although the Communist Party in Canada was a legal organization, it had been recognized for years that it was a potentially subversive force and protective governmental action had been taken as distinguished from protection against criminal acts. Mr. Robertson agreed with a suggestion that one difference between Communism and Separatism was that the former implied allegiance to another country, but suggested that the latter implied allegiance to a future separate nation of Quebec.

The Commissioner of the R.C.M.P. said that he would require clear direction from the government before embarking on the same investigative activities against Separatists as he now conducted against Communists, because of the extreme sensitivity of the problem. The R.C.M.P. could produce documents on Separatist organizations, despite the lack of government direction in this area, and suggested that the problem was not so much that of obtaining more information but of putting to use information already available.

15(1)

that such information was readily available to the government. As to taking further action to gather information by clandestine means, this was of course possible, but he would feel obliged to point out the risks involved.

15(1)



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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

The Committee then turned to a consideration of the conclusions and recommendations of the Memorandum under discussion and made the following points concerning the conclusions:

- (a) The problem should be approached on the two levels of security and law and order on the one hand, dealing with the criminal subversive and violent aspects, and on the other the broader problem of national unity or "anti-Separatism", recognizing that the tools for dealing with each may have to be different.
- (b) there was general agreement that information and action should be effectively analysed and coordinated, and that consideration should be given the appropriate method of providing essential analysis and coordination.
- (c) While it was clear that closer Federal-Provincial cooperation would be necessary, it was important that federal initiative and independence be retained both in the gathering and analysis of information and in the conduct of operations.
- (d) That the risks involved in new federal initiatives be carefully balanced against the probable positive effects.

Concerning the recommendations set out in Section X of the Memorandum, the following points were made:

- (a) The general principles set out in the Memorandum were somewhat imprecise and did not appear to be necessary.
- (b) It would be of first importance for the Government to determine precisely the attitude which should be adopted towards Separatism as a phenomenon, and to determine whether that attitude should be publicly expressed in terms of a policy statement.
- (c) The proposed "central body" to coordinate and analyse information should be further studied in terms of method rather than organization, bearing in mind the need to separate the problem of law and order from that concerning national unity.
- (d) Although the R.C.M. Police had recently prepared an up-dated report on the present state of Separatism in Quebec, it should be further revised to provide a basis on which positive counter-action might be taken.
- (e) It was agreed that an immediate review be made of Canadian intelligence resources other than the R.C.M.P., and it was noted that the Intelligence Policy Committee would shortly be examining a memorandum to set forth intelligence policy and objectives of the government for submission to and consideration by the Cabinet Committee.
- (f) Although some Ministers expressed doubt as to the reliability of the proposed Joint Security Operations Planning Staff in conjunction with the Government of Quebec and with the City of Montreal, there was general

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- agreement that a coordinating unit at the police level was desirable and should be further examined, possibly in the context of aid to the civil power.
- (g) Further study would be required of the various contingencies which would have to be anticipated, particularly at the political level.
  - (h) Means of taking effective counter-action would be considered in due course by the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning on the basis of the memoranda to be prepared by Messrs Sharp and Turner on the priority problems of national unity and law and order.

The Committee agreed:

- (a) that the Memorandum under consideration be revised in the light of the foregoing discussion with a view to placing it before the Cabinet in due course;
- (b) that the recommendation entitled "Law Enforcement and Counter-Subversion" be reworded as follows:

"It is recommended that the Minister of Justice, in consultation with other Ministers concerned, bring forward proposals as to appropriate means of achieving closer Federal-Provincial cooperation in the fields of law and order and aid to the civil power, with a view to ensuring that the various governments concerned are fully informed on the criminal and subversive aspects of Separatism, and so organized as to deal with them effectively on a joint basis."

- (c) that the Intelligence Policy Committee be asked to examine the current intelligence programme in the context of the priority problems under discussion and to report to the Cabinet Committee thereon.

D.F. Wall,  
Secretary.

Privy Council Office

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December 16, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence - Friday, December 19, 1969

I attach in draft form a possible memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence to be considered at the meeting to be held this Friday. As it has been drafted for your signature, you will wish to ensure that it accurately reflects your own views. You will recall agreeing that you as Prime Minister should take the initiative in this matter in order to ensure that the problems requiring attention were brought forward in proper context and within a more manageable structure than was evident at the last "briefing" meeting of the Committee.

If the attached paper or some modification of it is acceptable to you, I would suggest that it be sent to the Ministers concerned a day or two prior to the meeting (possibly on Wednesday) to provide them time to study it.

As to the attendance at the meeting on Friday, I think it is desirable that, owing to the nature of the problem for discussion, the following officials be invited by their Ministers:

S 14.

15(1)

*P.M. - These are for the merged, which is larger because of angle and "intelligence" for distribution*

Mr. Wall and I will attend from this Office. If you agree to this roster of attendance, we will suggest to Ministers that they invite their Deputy Ministers to attend.

*I would suggest that we number the copies of the memo; not circulate it at the time of the meeting; and direct it to the Privy Council Office.*

*The case is the best with my view.*

*... to the C.C. ... to the ...*

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December 17, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence - Friday, December 19, 1969

S+I-10

I attach Copy No. 1 of the Top Secret Memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence entitled "Current Threats to National Order and Unity - Quebec Separatism", which will be considered at the meeting on Friday next at 2:00 p.m. in 340-S. It has been sent only to Ministers, but they have been asked to discuss the paper with their Deputy Ministers, and to invite them to the meeting

S.14.

If you agree,

I will collect all copies of the document at the end of the meeting.

The purpose of the paper is to set out the problem in general, to identify certain of the areas in which control and corrective action might be taken, and to propose a number of specific actions which might be taken in the immediate future. I think it is important to establish at the outset that the problems discussed in the paper must be dealt with in the larger context of the priority problem of National Unity (Mr. Sharp) and its subsidiary problem of Law and Order (Mr. Turner), in order to preserve the logical integrity of the

S.14.

There is no question that the problems discussed in this paper are multi-departmental in scope, and that solutions will require extensive consultation and a joint effort by the departments concerned.

S.14.

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S. 14 to provide a cohesive information base for decisions as to policies and programmes." It seems to us desirable that any such organization should be under the control and direction of the Prime Minister, and that it should be located in your Office or in the Privy Council Office. If the other Ministers agree to this, we might then proceed to devise the kind of mechanism required. If there are strong arguments against it, they should emerge in discussion.

The other possibly contentious recommendation

S. 14.

Should there be other matters in the Memorandum which you wish to discuss prior to the meeting, I will be happy to do so at any time.

D.F.W.

Privy Council Office.

TOP SECRET



I. PURPOSE

Action required to deal effectively with separatism

II. PROBLEM

Nat. Un. Law and Order

S.14

Indicators of seriousness of problem -

labour unrest particularly in essential services

high unemployment - getting worse

no jobs for students

problems in govt. - small majority. Internal  
splits - language bill - coming election.

open conversions, S14 - St. J. Bapt. Societe

influence of outside group on Quebec S14. Moral....

Outside interference ( )

financial strains on community

Problem cannot be dealt in Security complex.

Info required for govt. to;

- (a) anticipate serious difficulties
- (b) plan, execute, preventative and control measure
- (c) plan and execute long term curative measures.

III GENERAL PRINCIPLES

In addition to need to gather more and better info  
to co-ordinate it and put into effective use.

There is need of all govts. at all levels that it  
should be (all aimed) in spirit of co-operation not  
competition.

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Royal Commission recommendation  
(check I think this we are doing)

s 14.

Other sources are (news) - info through M.P.'s,  
P.M.'s regional desks etc.

V. NEED FOR CO-ORDINATION & ANALYSIS

- Sources above could be improved however most immediate need is for co-ordination and analysis to determine where gaps are and form integrated basis of info for (initial) control and long term curative action.

Need for particular kinds of info

s. 15(a)

(2) What is motivation for

s. 14.

(3) :

s. 14

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(4)

S.14.

If so, what are

they?

(5)

S.14.

Above proves need for a central mechanism to analyse and co-ordinate such info.

Means of Expanding sources of information

- (1)
- (2)
- (3)

S.15(1)

- (4)
- (5)

- (6)
- (7) expansion and re-direction of information gathering of party organization at all levels.
- (8) research in separatism not beviour and related

VI. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

a re-examination of statutes etc. re Force co-operatio has been done but further planning is required in view of situation which is worsening.

VI. CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Plans required to meet:

- (a) the referendum on separatism before or after Prov. elect.
- (b) P.Q. gaining balance of power or in fact elected
- (c) disintegration legal political machinery stemming from mass strikes ( ) - students teachers.
- (d) S.15(1).

VII. COUNTER ACTION

S.14.



To eliminate risks must be in closer co-operation with Prov. and Munic. govts concerned.

1 S.14.

IX CONCLUSIONS

- (a) situation in Quebec cannot be viewed as exclusive in context of "national security" or law and Order - it is to be viewed in the light of long-term national objectives.
- (b) need to establish a central body to co-ordinate and analyze info from all sources to have base for decisions as to policies and programs.
- (c) solution will come with close Fed-Prov. co-op.
- (d) risks involved in action taken will have to be balanced against the probable positive effects of such actions.

X RECOMMENDATIONS

Acceptance basic principles in III

- (b) Fed. policy in relation to separatism

Acceptance of section IV

- (c) Information



S. 14.

COUNTER ACTION

S. 14.



Need for specific policy decision.

Pg. 8 (b) (P.M.'s statement)

S. 14.

Pg. 9 (3)

9 (d) A good basis for discussion (PM)

PM - Policy will be a very import part of this overall group. Our resources would be better used if we had a planning body.

Mr. Turner -

S. 14.

Mr. Sharp -

S. 15(i).

Mr. Polletier:

S. 15(i).

S. 14.

CONCLUSIONS

Page 8

s.14

PM

RECOMMENDATIONS

Skip general principles and not record any view or other.

(C) Information

- (1) Re-phrase in accordance with (b) above on page 8
- (2) OK we will prepare a further paper

Page 9

3 PM - who would make the review

Mr. Robertson - I.P. Comm. and then bring it to this committee.

(d) Leave to Min. of Justice to work something out and make a recommendation.

A committee under Min. of Justice - inter-dept'l and examine it.

Contingency Planning

PM (e) At a later stage when we have done some of the other things we might see to this.

(f) Counter vito -

S. 14.



December 22nd, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALL:

National unity; Quebec separatism, etc.

Pursuant to the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence on Friday, I suppose that what is now wanted is a revision of the document - or is it sufficient to have the conventional type of Secretary's report in forwarding the document on to the Cabinet? The reason I am inclined to favour a revision is because in this particular subject area

541-11  
122-1

S.H.

Perhaps you could give this some thought and then we can discuss where we should go from here.

I am returning herewith the Prime Minister's copy of the memorandum that was discussed on Friday, together with the covering memorandum to him of December 16th.

R.G.R.

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