

# LESSONS LEARNED FROM USING BORROWER BASED MACROPRUDENTIAL TOOLS. THE NORWEGIAN CASE

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# The plan for my talk

## Borrower Based Regulation of Banks' Mortgage Loans

- Introduction
  - The motivation for and implementation of BBMs
- Assessing the effects of the BBMs
  - Benefits
  - Costs



# INTRODUCTION





# Motivation for BBMs

- A response to high growth in house prices and debt
- Prevent an increase in household vulnerability
- Prevent the building up of systemic risks



# House prices and household debt as a percentage of disposable income

1983Q1 – 2019Q1



Sources: Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Norwegian Association of Real Estate Agents (NEF), Real Estate Norway, Statistics Norway and Norges Bank



# Borrower-based regulation

Requirement	June 2015	Jan 2017 and current
Max. loan to value (LTV)	85%	85%
Debt-servicing		
• Interest rate increase of	5 p.p.	5 p.p.
• Compulsory principal payment	For LTVs > 70%	For LTVs > 60%
• Max. debt to income (DTI)		5 x pre-tax earnings
Regional requirements		Max. LTV 60% for secondary dwellings in Oslo
Speed limit (flexibility quota)	10%	10% 8% in Oslo



# ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTED BBMs

# We focus on


- Credit growth in vulnerable households
- Effect on house prices and aggregate credit growth
  - Significant effects
  - Time structure of the effect
- Distributional consequences
  - First-time buyers





# Mortgage requirements have had an effect

Percentage of new instalment loans in breach of requirement



Sources: Norwegian FSA's annual mortgage survey

# International analyses of BBMs

The effect on growth in house prices ( $\Delta P^h$ ) and credit ( $\Delta C$ )

- A growing number of papers is estimating the effect of BBMs using panel data including a large number of countries
- The results are ambiguous

	Reduce $\Delta P^h$		Reduce $\Delta C$	
	Short run	Long run	Short run	Long run
Carreras et al. (2018) JFS	DTI, LTV	DTI, LTV		DTI
Nymoene et al. (2019) IJFS	LTV		LTV, (DTI)	(DTI)

- Important with additional analyses!



# Analyses at Norges Bank using micro data

## Growth in house prices and credit

- Tax returns data on all Norwegian households 2004-2017
- Data on all housing transitions in the market
  - Price, address, buyer
- House prices in 57 geographical regions



# The effect of DTI on house price growth


## New requirement in 2017

- *Hypothesis:* The DTI limit has a higher impact on house price growth in areas with a high share of homebuyers with a high DTI (high exposure areas).
- Norway is divided into 57 areas. The share of homebuyers in 2014 with a  $DTI > 5$  is calculated. The speed limit is subtracted from the share. If this adjusted share is positive (zero or negative), the area is defined as being a «high exposure» («low exposure») area.



# House price growth in areas with high and low exposure to the DTI requirement

Four quarter growth. Percent. 2016 Q1 – 2019 Q1



# Estimating the effect of high exposure

$$(1) \Delta_j P_i^h = \alpha EXSP_i + X_i' \beta_1 + \beta_0 + \epsilon_i$$

$\Delta_j P_i^h$  is the j quarter growth in house prices in region i

$EXSP_i$  is a dummy variable. Equals 1 if the region is classified as a high exposure area

$X_i$  is a vector of controls (four quarter change in unemployment and housing supply)

Fixed effects: Large cities, Smaller cities



# Regression results

	2016q4 – 2017q4				2016q4-2019q1		2018q1-2019q1	
	I	II	III <sup>1</sup>	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
<i>EXSP=1</i>	-4.8***	-2.0*	-1.8*	-2.1*	-4,9***	-3.2**	0.3	-0.7
$\Delta_{10-16}P^h$				-0.02				
<i>X</i>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
City dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	57	57	42	57	57	57	57	57
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.57	0.19	0.56	0.20	0.38	-0.0	0.13

1) Without Oslo.

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level.



# Estimating the effect of high exposure

With time fixed effects

$$(2) \Delta_4 P_{it}^h = \alpha_1 EXSP_i + \alpha_{2t} \tau_t + \alpha_{3t} EXSP_i \cdot \tau_t + X'_{it} \beta_1 + \beta_0 + \epsilon_i$$

$\Delta_4 P_i^h$  is the four quarter growth in house prices in region i

$EXSP_i$  is a dummy variable. Equals 1 if the region is classified as a high exposure area

$X_i$  is a vector of controls (four quarter change in unemployment and housing supply)


$\tau_t$  is a time dummy for each quarter





# Time-varying effect on the four quarter house price growth of high exposure<sup>1</sup>

Percent. 2016q2 – 2019q1




1) Dotted lines show plus/minus two times the standard deviation.

Sources: Ambita, Eiendom Norge, Eiendomsverdi, Finn.no, Statistisk sentralbyrå and Norges Bank




# Exposure and growth in debt per person<sup>1</sup> in high exposure areas. Percent. 2017

All




Homebuyers



1) 2017 debt per person compared with average debt per person of 2014-2016.

Reference: Borchgrevink and Torstensen, Economic Commentaries 1/2018. Norges Bank

# Exposure and number of home buyers<sup>1</sup>. High exposure areas. Percent. 2017



1) Number of homebuyers in 2017 relative to the average of 2010-2016.

Reference: Borchgrevink and Torstensen, Ecoomic Commentaries 1/2018. Norges Bank



# To summarize

Our analysis shows that

- BBMs reduce the number of vulnerable household
- The DTI limit reduces growth in house prices and credit in the medium term – at least in high exposure areas relative to low exposure areas
- The negative effect on house price growth lasts 1½ year. The level effect is still present after 2 years



**THANK YOU!**




**EXTRA**



# The distribution of LTV among first-time buyers 18-39 years shifted in 2012

The guideline changed from 0.9 to 0.85 December 2011



# First-time buyers

Age 21-31

- We analyse
  - if parental support is important for children's first home investment
  - if parental support has become increasingly important over time.
- Estimate the probability of young persons buying their first home





# Main findings

- We find significant positive effects on children' probability of buying their first home from
  - Parental financial and collateral wealth
  - Inter vivos gifts
  - **Own income and financial wealth**
- Over time, the importance of parental support has increased



## 2 The model

Logit estimation. The probability to buy the first home

$$\Pr[\Delta H_{it} = 1] = \frac{1}{\exp\left\{-\left(\alpha + \beta \ln Y_{it}^p + \gamma \ln W_{i,t-1}^p + \varphi X_{it} + \text{extensions}\right)\right\} - 1}$$


$$\text{extensions} = \delta \ln Y_{it}^k + \vartheta \ln W_{i,t-1}^k + \tau \ln WH_{i,t-1}^p + \theta T_{it}$$

$\Delta H_{it} = 1$  if individual  $i$  buys its first home in period  $t$ ;  
 $Y$  = income;  $W$  = financial wealth;  $WH$  = housing wealth;  
 $T$  = dummy for inter vivos gift;  $p$  = parents;  $k$  = child;  
 $X_{it}$  = (age, gender, marital status, own children, big city, siblings, student, time dummies)



# Average marginal effect on the propensity to buy from receiving inter vivos gift

Age 21-31 years




From Halvorsen and Lindquist (2017), Working paper 19, Norges Bank  
Data source: Statistics Norway



# Mean ownership-rate difference across parental wealth position groups increases

Share. Young 21-31 years



From Halvorsen and Lindquist (2017), Working paper 19, Norges Bank  
Data source: Statistics Norway



# The macroprudential institutions

