Written Evidence: Defence in the High North

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A team from Brunel University of London - Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies and Nord University, Norway - Nord Arctic responded to the UK Parliament Defence Committee Inquiry into Defence in the High North.

The Response from Prof Corine Wood-Donnelly, (NORD University, Norway), Prof Matthew S. Seligmann, Dr Kristian Gustafson, and Dr Steven Wagner, (Brunel University of London, Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies) highlights:

1) The changing technological landscape intensifies the geographic volume that must be considered in defence and security policy. Arctic geography is not only a 2-D horizontal space but is a 3-D space that also includes vertical dimensions (from ocean floor to air space, low earth orbit). This creates both opportunities for cross-border collaboration but also introduces new domains of vulnerability.

2) China's arctic engagement is not only opportunism but is a systematic and multigeneration programme focused on trade routes, resources, influence, and security. The latter issue has led to cooperation with Russia, especially following the pause in cooperation with the Arctic Council since 2022. The response strategy must be varied and appropriately matched to instruments and technologies.

3) The science-security-governance nexus practiced by China creates a structural gap in UK Strategy as the UK High North policy engages only with the security dimension while leaving science and governance disconnected and therefore cannot be seen as a robust strategy. It should be an ambition to increase the UK's science diplomacy and collaboration in cross-border research in the Arctic.

4) UK policy must project both deterrence and reassurance. Presence, Persistence, and Capability are needed for deterrence; Communication, Cooperation and Patterns are needed for reassurance.

5) The UK must ensure it has vessels that are in the Polar Classes required for operations in areas covered by the Polar Code to avoid legal barriers to physical access. Maritime and aviation assets designed or suitable for use in the High North are broadly deployable anywhere they can be based, crewed and maintained. But the reverse is not always be used year-round in the High North.

See the full evidence submission here

(published by the Defence Committee, 28th April 2026)